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INTRODUCTION

Strict tort liability represents an innovation in traditional tort
law formally articulated seventeen years ago in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.' As a twentieth century legal doctrine, strict
tort liability reflects, and is predicated upon, the economic and social philosophies that have evolved and flourished in our modern
society. Among the socio-economic bases that underlie the strict
tort liability concept is the perceived recognition that product suppliers possess a greater capacity than injured consumers to bear
the catastrophic cost of injuries sustained in product involved accidents." As a corollary of this rationale, the manufacturer or other
supplier in the marketing chain is deemed to occupy a better position for distributing product-related losses to the general consuming public in the form of increased product cost. Another rationale
frequently utilized to justify adoption of the strict tort liability
doctrine is deterrence. The imposition of strict liability on a product supplier purportedly insures that the supplier will introduce
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. See, e.g., Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 871 n.2 (8th Cir. 1974);
Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467 P.2d 256, 261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 60, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
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only safe products into the channels of commerce.$
Despite its recent appearance on the tort stage, the doctrine of
strict tort liability has, for all practical purposes, replaced negli-

gence, implied warranty and contract as the principal cause of action in product involved accidents. This has occurred because the
impeding factors necessary to establish liability under the more
traditional theories of liability are absent under strict tort liability.
For example, privity of contract has been abrogated as a requirement for prosecuting an action in strict tort liability. Additionally,
unlike the common-law negligence cause of action, the conduct of
the product supplier is irrelevant. Rather, the 4essence of strict tort
liability is the condition of the product itself.
A cause of action predicated on strict tort liability is comprised

of four essential elements: (1) a defective product; (2) that reaches
the consumer without substantial change in its condition from the
time of original sale; (3) that contains a defect that renders the
product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) causes injury to the ultimate user.8 The defect itself may be in the form of a manufacturing flaw, a defect in design, or the subject of this article, a marketing defect." Marketing defects, as distinguised from manufacturing
and design defects, involve (1) the failure to provide any warning
whatsoever of the risks or hazards involved in the use of the prod3. See Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Or. 1969), afl'd, 437 F.2d
822 (9th Cir. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 799 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974);
Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959, 961-62 (Ill. 1980); Gonzales v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978).
5. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974); Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston flst Dist.) 1981, no writ); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 868
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Union Supply Co. v. Pust,
583 P.2d 276, 282 (Colo. 1978); Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 404 A.2d 1094, 1097 (N.H. 1979).
Some jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement of unreasonably dangerous. For a general review of the cases, see Fruend v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc, 432 A.2d 925, 929 (N.J.
1981).
6. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1981)
(design defect in manufacture of oral contraceptive); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416
S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1967) (permanent wave solution contained manufacturing defect);
Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec., 618 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1981,
writ rerd n.r.e.) (dangerous nondefective product without adequate warning is marketing
defect).
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uct, (2) the failure to provide an adequate warning of the dangers,
risks and hazards involved in the use of a product, and/or (3) the
failure to provide appropriate and adequate instructions and directions for the safe use of a product.7 The trier of fact must ascertain
whether a product flawlessley produced and designed may nevertheless possess such potential danger to the user in the absence of
an appropriate warning that it becomes defective simply because
of the warning's absence.
II.

THE DUTY TO WARN OR TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS

A.

When the Duty Arises
An actionable marketing defect cause of action
is comprised of
five essential elements. Initially, there must exist a risk of harm
that is inherent in the product or that may arise from the intended
or reasonably anticipated use of the product. Second, the product
supplier must actually know or reasonably foresee the risk of harm
at the time the product is marketed. Third, the product must possess a marketing defect, i.e., a failure to provide any warning of the
danger, a failure to provide an adequate warning of the danger or
hazard, and/or a failure to provide adequate or appropriate instructions and directions for avoiding the hazard or danger in the
use of the product. Fourth, the absence of the warning and/or instructions must render the product unreasonably dangerous to the
ultimate user or consumer of the product. And finally, the failure
to warn and/or instruct must constitute a causative nexus in the
product user's injury.
The first two of these factors are essential in establishing a duty
to warn or instruct. The duty to warn or to instruct presupposes
both an inherent product danger and a known or foreseeable danger at the time of marketing. 8 In the absence of either of these two
7. See Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy Of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 398,
398-99 (1970); see also Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979) ("an absence of proper warning .

.

. can range from a complete absence of

any warning to a warning which is given but is inadequate"). A defect necessarily includes a
lack of adequate warnings. Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1978).
8. See Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 1976) (duty to warn
arises when product is unreasonably or inherently dangerous); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (seller under duty to warn of dangers that
are reasonably forseeable), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The duty to warn contemplates
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crucial factors, a duty to provide warnings and instruction is absent. Each of these elements merit individual attention.
The duty to warn has generally been perceived to arise when the
risk or harm presented by a product exceeds the danger normally
contemplated or anticipated by the ordinary consumer.9 As formulated in the Restatement, the article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it.' 0 Underlying the duty to provide an
adequate warning of the dangers associated with the product use is
the rationale that the ultimate user of the product is entitled to all
meaningful information of a product's characteristics necessary to
make an informed choice whether the utility and need for the
product outweighs the potential risk of harm attendant to its use.'
All products necessarily present some potential risk of harm either
in their intended or reasonably foreseeable use or environment of
use."2 It does not follow, however, that a product posing some risk
all potential dangers which are known or which could have been known. See, e.g., Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Caplaco One, Inc., v. Amerex
Corp., 572 F.2d 634, 636 (8th Cir. 1978); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
9. See, e.g., Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1976)
(basic test of defect is failure to meet reasonable expectations of ordinary user); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (must be so dangerous a
reasonable man would not buy if knew danger), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Southern
Cal. Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 175 Cal. Rptr. 67, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (reasonable man standard applies to determine unreasonable danger).
10. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). Comment i specifically
provides that "It]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." Id.
11. See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1978); Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974). The duty to warn depends on the foreseeability of serious harm. See
Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 601 P.2d 298, 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Cavers v.
Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). Since the duty to
furnish a warning or instruction for safe use involves a balancing of the risk of harm against
the cost of providing a warning, the critical issue focuses on reducing or eliminating excessive preventable dangers by providing the user with adequate warnings and instruction for
safe use. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974).
12. See Korpela, Failure To Warn As Basis Of Liability Under Doctrine Of Strict Liability In Tort, 53 A.L.R. 3d 239, 251 (1973). Korpela noted "since the use of almost any
product involves some degree of danger, the duty of a manufacturer to warn of danger must
be related, or made dependent upon, the degree of danger involved in the use of the prod-
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of harm should not be marketed. Rather, the ultimate user is entitled to sufficient knowledge of the significant dangers to weigh the
risk of harm against the need for the product. Of course, when the
product is determined to be unreasonably dangerous per se, then
no warning or instruction for use will justify marketing the
product. 13
B.

Scope of the Product Supplier's Duty

As the basis for providing an adequate warning of the hazards in
the use of products and appropriate instructions for the safe use
and the avoidance of potential dangers associated with a product,
the product supplier is obligated to keep abreast of the current
state of knowledge and advances of its product available through
research, reports of dangers, scientific developments and technical
breakthroughs.' 4 This means that the supplier is held to the stanuct." Id. at 251; see also Little, Product Liability-The Growing UncertaintyAbout Warnings, 12 FORUM 995, 997 (1977). The author observes that, "[i]t is fairly well settled that the
manufacturer or seller need not give warning of such dangers or problems as present only a
very slight risk of harm or from which the damage or injury would, at best, be minimal." Id.
at 997.
13. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (lst Cir. 1981);
d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). The court in
Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1981) adopted a two-step
analysis for determining if a product is "unreasonably dangerous per se":
Once it is determined that the product is unavoidably unsafe and that the danger is
warned against, it must be determined whether the product is so unsafe that marketing it at all is 'unreasonably dangerous per se.' In order to decide whether the product
is unreasonably dangerous per se, a court must balance the utility of the product
against its dangers.
Id. at 401.
14. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir.) (manufacturer is
held to skill of expert in his field and is presumed to possess an expert's knowledge of arts,
materials and processes of business), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (manufacturer held to knowledge
and skill of expert), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561
S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978) (if manufacturer should have known of potential dangers adequate warnings must be given). In Dias v. Daisy-Heddon, 390 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979) the court noted that, by analogy to prescriptive drug cases-charging a manufacturer
with the knowledge of the risk known to science during the period in which the plaintiff was
using the product, manufacturers in other type cases likewise are charged with the knowledge of experts in their fields of interest. Id. at 226-27. The manufacturer is obligated to
keep abreast of the current state of knowledge gained through research reports, scientific
literature and other methods. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87,
91 (2nd Cir. 1980); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
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dards of an expert on the particular product and presumed to
know all the dangers that exist in a product at the time it is marketed.' Excusable ignorance which is a relevant issue in a negligence action is simply immaterial in strict tort liability. The ultimate emphasis is the knowledge of potential risk that is known or
that reasonably should have been known based on available data.1 6
When it becomes known or is reasonably foreseeable to a manufacturer that a particular product may pose a serious risk or danger when used for its intended or reasonably anticipated purposes,
the product supplier must balance the potential risk of harm
against the product usefulness in determining whether or not to
market the product. In determining this balance, such relevant factors as the normal expectations of the consumer as to the manner
in which the product will perform, the degree of simplicity or complication that is involved in the use of the product, the magnitude
of the danger to which the user will be exposed, the likelihood of
harm to the user, and the danger avoiding effects of a warning
must be considered.1 7 When the balance is not struck in favor of
the utility of the product then no warning will be adequate to prevent the product from being characterized as unreasonably dangerAllen v. Upjohn Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9173 (Tenn.
App. 1982).
15. See Kariala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975); Seley
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981); Walter v. Valley, 363 So. 2d 1266,
1270 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
16. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2nd Cir. 1969); Hall v. E.I.
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Woodill v. Parke Davis
& Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (I11.1980). But see Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy Of
Information, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 398, 404 (1970).
[Ilf the sale of the product under all the circumstances under which it was marketed
subjected the consumer or others to an unreasonable risk of harm, the seller is subject
to liability, and it is not relevant that he neither knew nor could have known nor
ought to have known in the exercise of ordinary care that the unreasonable risk actually existed. It is enough that had he known of the risk and dangers he would not
have marketed the product at all or he would have done so differently.
Id. at 404.
17. See Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 142, 148-49 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979). The court in Carers noted that merely providing that a product was dangerous
"would turn every manufacturer into an insurer as long as the plaintiff could show (a) that
the product contained no warning and (b) that he was injured while using it." Id. at 149.
Liability based solely on a finding of danger without consideration of balancing relevant
factors is inappropriate. See generally Little, Products Liability-The Growing Uncertainty About Warnings, 12 FORUM 995, 997 (1977).
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ous per se. 18

When the utility of the product outweighs its harmful effects,
then the product is not necessarily unreasonably dangerous to
market." This means that the risk of danger is outweighted by the
beneficial purposes in making the product available and it is not
unreasonably dangerous per se.10 The court, in the first instance,
must determine whether the harmful effects of the product both
qualitatively and quantitavely outweigh the legitimate public interest in having the particular product available."1 If qualitatively
and quantitatively a particular product serves the public good,
then the product is not unreasonably dangerous as marketed provided the product is accompanied by an adequate warning." The
18. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981);
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978). Perhaps the most succinct analysis of this principle is captured in Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1981).
"[A] court will impose strict product liability even if a warning is given if the product remains unsafe when the warning is followed and the risk of danger outweighs any apparent
usefulness of the product." Id. at 400.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). Under comment i a
product is unreasonably dangerous only when it is dangerous to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer. Id. In order to prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to provide direction for safe use or a warning of
the risks of harm attendant to its use. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j
(1965). Some products are unavoidably unsafe and under the current state of scientific and
technological knowledge cannot be made safe. The unavoidably unsafe products likewise
may be marketed provided the utility of the product outweights the risk of harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
20. See Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1981). The
evaluation of a product as unreasonably dangerous per se in the absence of an adequate
warning was suggested in Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy Of Information, 48
TEXAS L. REV. 398, 404 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981);
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). As suggested in Brochu if the court determines that the dangerous propensity is unnecessary, then the product, regardless of its utility is defective unless
the danger is unavoidable and the utility of the product is great. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j & k (1965). Under these circumstances, liability for marketing product may be avoided provided the product is accompanied by the proper warning. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d
652, 657 (1st Cir. 1974); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1979). This
qualitative analysis was undertaken in Racer v. Johnson & Johnson [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9082 (Mo. App. 1981), involving a flammable disposable
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failure to provide an adequate warning of the known or reasonably

knowable risks of harm in an otherwise beneficial product makes
the product unreasonably dangerous.
In addition to adequately warning the user concerning the dangers inherent in the intended uses of the product, the supplier is
obligated to warn of those dangers and hazards inherent in a reasonably foreseeable but unintended use of the product." It is not
incumbent upon the product supplier, however, to warn of every
risk of harm or mishap that may occur in the use of a product.2 4 In
particular, the product supplier is not required to foresee or anticipate bizarre or wholly unexpected product misuse."' If the rule
were otherwise, the supplier would assume the status of insurer.2 6
Except for the most philosophically expansive jurisdictions, the
doctrine of strict tort liability does not transform a product supplier into an insurer for product related injuries.
The duty to warn, once invoked, is not necessarily continuing in
nature after the product has been marketed. As noted by the New
drape used in performing D & C surgery. In making the requisite analysis, the court noted:
It is a highly useful product which affords substantially increased protection against
infection during surgical procedures. Its water-repellant attributes increase these protections. In the state of knowledge at the time of the injury no material making the
product fire resistant was available which did not adversely affect its barrier against
infection or create potential injury to the patient from allergy or disease. It is also
clear that it is highly flammable. It is designed for gynecological surgery where use of
a cautery is not unusual. In such a posture, we conclude that the evidence supports
the conclusion that liability under Section 402A could attach to a drape because of its
flammable nature in the absence of a warning of that danger (emphasis added).
Id. $ 9082, at 21, 111.
23. See,e.g., Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 54-55 (N.D. 1974) (warning of danger from foreseeable misuse of product must be adequate to point out danger of injury from
any misuses); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1972) (product not
defective; danger was failure to warn consumers of improper use); Lopez v. ARO Corp., 584
S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (seller owed duty to
give adequate warnings of dangers of using tool as grinder without guards).
24. See Stief v. J.A. Sexauer Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 453, 462 (2d Cir. 1967); Jamieson v.
Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
25. See, e.g., Caplaco One, Inc. v. Amerex Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (E.D. Mo.
1977) (when indicator on fire extinguisher read "RECHARGE" it was obvious to ordinary
user that extinguisher contained an improper amount of pressure); McCaleb v. Mackey
Paint Mfg. Co., 343 So. 2d 511, 514 (Ala. 1977) (use of flammable chemical as paint thinner
around operation which produced substantial heat and sparks was unintended use);
Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 848 (N.H. 1978) (product misuse and abnormal uses are defenses to strict liability).
26. The concept of absolute liability for product related accidents contravenes the purpose and intent of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
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Jersey Court in Jackson v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
Co. :17

There is no duty upon the seller of a machine faultlessly designed
and manufactured, . . . , to notify its customers after the time of
sale of changes in the state of the art concerning the safe operation
of such machine and advise them to install any new, updated or improved safeguards developed since the time of sale."
The concept of a continuing duty to warn is unrealistic in the
marketing environment for most products, except perhaps those
products sold for which the manufacturer maintains some form of
permanent record or preserves contact with the purchasers. The
imposition of a continuing duty is a rather unrealistic concept in
the context of either disposable products or products that are distributed in volume on a national basis. There may be justification
for issuing warnings of newly discovered risks or dangers for products that are recorded and the user's identity is readily discoverable. 9 The same capacity for continuous warning may be available
for ethical drugs since only the physician may prescribe the drug
after making an informed choice. Therefore, the individual to
whom the duty of warning is owed is readily identifiable and supplemental information can be distributed. In most product sales,
however, the product is sold without any record of the purchaser or
the product's ultimate destination. A continuing duty to warn,
therefore, appears inappropriate as the basis for imposing liability.
Notwithstanding this obvious limitation, several jurisdictions have
0
imposed a continuing duty to warn of newly discovered dangers.2

27. 400 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
28. Id. at 89.
29. See Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923-24 (Wis. 1979). In
Kozlowski the court in evaluating the concept of a continuing duty to warn concluded that
the determinative factor was the feasibility of the seller in keeping a record of all purchases
and the extent of the market for a particular product. Id. at 923-24.

30. Several jurisdictions have held that after a product is sold and a dangerous defect is
discovered the manufacturer has a continuing duty to provide the users with adequate
warnings of the danger. See, e.g., LaBelle v. McCauley Indus. Corp., 649 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir.
1981); Braniff Airways Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1969); Noel v.
United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 1964); see also Ramp, The Impact Of
Recall Campaigns On Products Liability, 44 INS. CouNs. J. 83, 85 (1977).
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C. Types of Risk That Mandate a Warning
The duty to warn is imposed as a matter of law based on the
unique, dangerous propensities of a particular product. Generally,
marketing defects encompass products that (1) are intrinsically or
inherently dangerous to the ultimate user, (2) present a high risk
of danger under certain unusual and unintended uses, (3) are dangerous only to a few individuals who possess an idiosyncratic susceptibility, and (4) are unavoidably unsafe. Thus, the nature of the
product constitutes the primary factor governing the duty to warn.
1. Potential Inherent or Intrinsic Danger or Harm
Certain products, because of intrinsic propensities, present the
potential for serious harm to the ultimate user of the product.
These high-risk products are commonly used products, such as vehicles, chemicals and heavy industrial machinery. It is rather clear
that the potential for serious harm incident to normal product use
is determinative in establishing the supplier's duty to provide an
adequate warning and to provide directions and instructions for
safe use.
In Hamilton v. Motor Coach Industries,81 a mechanic sustained
injuries resulting in blindness in one eye while attempting to repair
a spring-loaded air cylinder used in a bus. The inherent danger of
disassembling a spring-loaded cylinder created an issue whether
the air cylinder was unreasonably dangerous in the absence of a
warning and whether the warning (contained only in parts manual
delivered to the bus purchaser and not affixed to the cylinder itself) was sufficient to provide an adequate warning to the
8
plaintiff. 2
Similarly, in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.,3s the plaintiff sustained injuries when the lug bolts on the wheel of his motor home
31. 569 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e).
32. Id. at 574; cf McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1979)
(warning in owner's manual of possibility of electrocution was adequate; posting warnings
on sailboat mast would be impractical; and failure to warn was not cause of injury); Beier v.
International Harvester Co., 178 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Minn. 1970) (since it was impossible for
lug bolts securing inner wheels of truck to become loose while outer nuts were tight warning
of this occurence in the manual would have been superfluous); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 576 P.2d 426, 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (dangerous features of hatchcover in DC-10
created issue of whether adequate warning had been given).
33. 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
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sheared off causing the dual wheels to become disengaged while
the vehicle was in transit. The detachment occurred because plaintiff failed to apply manufacturer specified torque to the lug bolts
and to test the torque pressure at designated intervals. Although
the torque requirements were specified in the owner's manual, the
inherent danger of improper torquing in the event the directions
were ignored created a duty on the supplier to warn the user of the
risks involved in failing to heed the instructions."'
Ordinary household products and clothing likewise possess inherent risks of harm that may trigger the duty to warn. In Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,3 5 plaintiff was injured when a fragment of steel from a hammer he was using struck his eye. The
failure to warn that, once chipped, the hammer would likely chip
again was fatal. Similarly, the inherent flammability of certain
fabrics compel a warning that reasonably conveys to the purchaser
the risk of ignition. 6
The duty to warn is perhaps most frequently imposed by the
high risk of harm inherent in the operation of heavy industrial machinery and chemical products. Generally, a duty to warn of the
risk of harm and the instructions for safe use are critical in these
types of products.8a This duty, of course, is dictated to a significant
34. Id. at 988. The court emphasized the absence of any warning of the inherent risk
involved if the torque requirements were not satisfied. Id. at 988.
35. 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
36. See, e.g., Mattocks v. Daylin, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 663, 668 (W.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 611 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1979); Spencer v. Nelson Sales Co., 620 P.2d 477, 482
(Okla. Ct. App. 1980); Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 725 (N.H. 1976).
37. The more serious the potential danger or risk of harm, the more important the duty
to provide a full and fair warning of the risks of harm to insure the user is awarded a
meaningful opportunity to make an informed choice. See Sowles v. Urschel Laboratories,
Inc., 595 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1979) (a poultry dicing machine); Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A., 577 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1978) (a chemical isobutyl acrylate
involved); Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1978) (open blade on industrial table saw); Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) (trichloroethylene); Reliance Ins. Co. v. AL E. & C. Ltd., 539 F.2d 1101, 1106(7th Cir. 1976) (coal
box used for gas liquification); Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir.
1970) (dynamite); Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1969) (towmotor
forklift); Rogers v. Unimac, Co., 565 P.2d 181, 186 (Ariz. 1977) (spinning extractor basket on
a commercial washer extractor machine); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978) (liquid xylene); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (Colo. 1978)
(conveyor belt system); Potthoff v. Alms, 583 P.2d 309, 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (earth
moving machine scraper); Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (volatile adhesive); Bohnert Equip., Co. v. Kendall, 569 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Ky.
1978) (large crane); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976) (power
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degree by the type of the product involved. When the risk of harm
is great but the utility of the product essential, the product may
safely be marketed provided it is accompanied by an adequate
warning of the hazards and risk of harm. 8 Conversely, when the
risk of harm is great but the utility served by the product is not
particularly critical, the nature and intensity of the warning is
more stringently evaluated.
2.

Foreseeability of Dangers From Unintended Product Use

In addition to furnishing warnings of the inherent or intrinsic
dangers in the use of a product, the product supplier is obligated
to warn of the dangers associated with the reasonably anticipated
although unintended uses- of the product.8 ' The requirement of
foreseeability of unintended product use is mandated by the provisions of the Restatement.' It is not the dangers posed by any bigrinding machine); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934, 939 (N.M. 1977) (warning device
to be affixed to a large crane); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 535 (N.D.
1977) (dangers of a conveyor belt system); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267,
271 (Ohio 1977) (power punch press); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (grinding cuprock
attached to grinding device); Eddleman v. Scalco, 484 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reaction of calcium carbide in certain environment); Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 570 P.2d 438, 442 (Wash. 1977) (flow rate device used
to measure chemical components of agricultural fertilizer); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 579
P.2d 940, 947 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (chemical ethylchloroform), afl'd as modified, 594 P.2d
911 (Wash. 1979); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 550 P.2d 71, 75-76 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1976) (power grinding machine).
38. See, e.g., d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1977);
Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Uloth v.
City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy Of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 398, 410 (1970).
39. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) (triable issue of adequacy of warning where plaintiff died from inhaling trichloroethylene);
Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980) (manufacturers should
have known paneling might be placed in room without windows which increases its flammability); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statement of "Use Safety Guard" was not
sufficient as a warning); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h
(1965). "Where, however, he [manufacturer] has reason to anticipate that danger may result
from a particular use, . . . he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger." Id.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). Comment j states that
"seller is required to give warning ... if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge .... Id. In D'Arienzo v.
Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1973) a summary judgment on the basis
of contributory negligence was denied though it was clear the instructions accompanying a
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zarre use of a product that dicates a duty to warn or instruct.
Rather, it is the dangers presented by the known or reasonably
foreseeable uses or environment of use that determine whether a
duty to warn exists. 1
Foreseeable use of a product implies both normal or intended
use and reasonably foreseeable unintended uses.42 As observed by
8
the court in Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chemical Co.,'

In the absence of special reason to expect otherwise, the maker
is entitled to assume that his product will be put to a normal use for
which the product is intended or appropriate; and he is not subject
to liability when it is safe for all such uses and harm results only
because it is mishandled in a way which he has no reason
to expect
4
or as used in some unusual and unforeseeable manner. 4
In Byrd v. Hunt Tool Shipyards, Inc.,' 5 a sandblaster-painter
contracted silicosis from inhaling silica dust despite his use of a
safety hood. The hood, which was designed to protect against the
hazard of silicosis, was ineffective even when used with a respirator. Under these circumstances, the failure to warn that the protective hood was dangerous for its normal and intended functions rendered the product unreasonably dangerous.
Most product uses are not so clear and unequivocal. The characterization of product uses as reasonably intended or foreseeable is
a variable that does not lend itself to precise definition. For example, in Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,' 7 the plaintiff was injured

bottle of hair dye directed user to perform a patch test before each use, but failed to indicate in the directions the reason for continuing to perform the tests and failed to describe in
detail the possible adverse reactions. Id. at 110-13.
41. See, e.g., Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1981)
(failure to warn results in liability where danger is not obvious to user, and manufacturer
had reason to believe that danger might result from some foreseeable use); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (requirement that danger be reasonably foreseeable or scientifically discoverable is significant limitation on seller's
liability), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801,
804 (Tex. 1978) (drug manufacturer failed to give adequate warnings since he should have
known of potential harm).
42. McLaughlin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 281 A.2d 587, 588 (N.H. 1971).
43. 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 27. See generally Noel, Products Defective Because Of Inadequate Directions Or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 274 (1969).
45. 650 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 48.
47. 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978).
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as he attempted to mow a steep. slope contrary to the specific procedures outlined by the seller. Mowing the steep slope in an up
and down fashion rather than longitudinally along the side of the
slope was deemed neither an intended nor a reasonably foreseeable
4
use.4 8 In Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten,'
however, a surgical needle fractured as a physician was performing abdominal surgery. Although
the physician was manipulating the needle improperly, it was
noted that the physician was using the needle for its intended purpose and in a reasonably foreseeable manner.
Even foreseeable misuse may impose a duty to warn. For example, in LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,a0 plaintiff's son
was fatally injured when a tire failed while he was operating his
vehicle at speeds that exceeded 100 miles per hour. Although operation of the vehicle at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour was
an abuse of the product, the vehicle's design capablility to travel in
excess of 100 miles per hour was a reasonably foreseeable use. 1
Since the manufacturer of the vehicle realized that the tire on the
vehicle was designed for a maximum operating speed of 85 miles
per hour, a warning in the owner's manual that "continuous driving over 90 miles per hour requires using high speed capability
tires" was an inadequate warning. Similarly, in Sturm, Ruger &
Co. v. Day,8 ' plaintiff was sitting in the cab of a pickup truck while
unloading a .41 magnum single action revolver. The gun slipped
out of his hands and, when he grabbed for it, the gun fired and
caused serious injuries. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded as a
matter of law that dropping the pistol during unloading was clearly
foreseeable.58
An adequate warning is essential when a particular product may
be used in an unintended but reasonably foreseeable environment." In Russell v. G.A.F. Corp.,6 plaintiff, a carpenter, was in48. Id. at 46-47; accord McCaleb v. Mackey Paint Mfg. Co., 343 So. 2d 511, 514 (Ala.
1977) (using paint thinning chemical to dip bumpers was not an intended or foreseeable
use).
49. 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
50. 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).

51. Id. at 257. The court noted that "[njormal use, however, takes on a special meaning
that is synonymous with 'foreseeable use.'" Id. at 257.
52. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
53. Id. at 45.

54. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 20 (Md. 1975) (Faberge knowing its
cologne was flammable could reasonably foresee that cologne might come close enough to
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stalling sheets of corrugated asbestos cement in an interior ceiling
when he stepped down upon one such sheet and the sheet shattered, causing him to fall. Plaintiff contended that the manufacturer was obligated to place a warning on each ceiling sheet that
the sheet should not be walked upon. Product suppliers were
aware that it was common practice within the industry to walk on
the materials without the use of underlying support grids to distribute stress. Although use of the ceiling sheets as a walking surface was not intended, knowledge that the product was customarily
used in this environment imposed on the supplier a duty to warn
of the risk of harm attendant to that usage."
7 plaintiff,
In American Laudry Machinery Industries v. Horan,5
a hot air ballonist, was injured when an industrial clothes dryer
exploded. Plaintff placed his wet ballon in one bin of the dryer's
spinning basket and placed an equal weight of regular laundry in
the other bin. Because the ballon was made of a waterproof or nonabsorbent material which retained more water than the regular
laundry, an imbalance in the spinning basket was created which
ultimately resulted in an explosion. The manufacturer was obligated to warn of the danger involved in not equally distributing
absorbent and non-absorbent materials in the two bins of the spinning basket. Rejecting the contention that use of the product to
dry large hot air ballons was a bizarre and entirely unforeseeable
event the court declared: "The pertinent inquiry, in this instance,
is not whether the harm that occurred-the actual use-was itself
foreseeable, but rather whether it fell 'within a general field of
danger which should have been anticipated.' ,,8
A warning likewise may be necessary when a component part of
a product presents the potential for harm. In Lantis v. Astec In-

flame to burn); Smith v. United States Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 254 (Okla. 1980) (wall
adhesive ignited by an electric fan did not contain adequate warnings, of its flammability);
Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 533 P.2d 316, 318 (Or. 1975) (manufacturer failed to warn of
potato vine burner's tendency to heat up on windy days). Foreseeability includes "the
probability of the occurrence of a general type of risk involving the loss, rather than the
probability of the occurrence of the precise chain of events preceding the loss .... Tucci v.
Bossert, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 328, 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
55. 422 A.2d 989 (D.C. 1980).
56. Id. at 994.
57. 412 A.2d 407 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
58. Id. at 413.
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dustries, Inc.,"9 the court noted that a component part of an unassembled product is itself a product requiring a warning where the
use is foreseeable by the manufacturer. Plaintiff's husband was fatally injured when in the course of reassembling an asphalt plant
he fell through an opening in a service platform. The plaintiff
urged that the components were unreasonably dangerous due to
the manufacturer's failure to warn of the danger posed by the
opening in the platform. The manufacturer contended that the occurrence of an injury prior to complete assembly of the product for
its intended purpose precluded an action for strict tort liability.
The court, however, declared that a manufacturer is required to
warn of potential dangers inherent or reasonably foreseeable in the
particular use of the component."0 The manufacturer not only contemplated but intended that the assemblers of the asphalt plant
would use the service platform during the reassembly process. Similarly, in Shanks v. A.F.E. Industries, Inc.,61 the failure of a component manufacturer to warn of dangers presented by installation
of a component into a larger product rendered the component unreasonably dangerous." This general rule is subject to the limitation that the manufacturer contemplate or reasonably foresee that
the component will be utilized in a particular manner or in a reasonably foreseeable environment.
The product supplier, while under no duty to warn of unforeseeable misuses of a product, may be required to warn of the dangers
inherent in reasonably foreseeable product misuse. The manufacturer is obligated to anticipate the environment in which the product will be used and to give notice of the potential risks arising
from use in the foreseeable environment. The "environmental approach" was utilized in Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc.," to impose upon the manufacturer a duty to warn of the hazards associated with the misadjustment of the governor-carburetor linkage
59. 648 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 1121.

61. 403 N.E.2d 849 (Ind.Ct. App. 1980).
62. Id. at 856.

63. Foreseeable environment, like foreseeable use of the product, determines the manufacturer's duty to warn of potential damages and instruct in the safe use of the product. See,

e.g., Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989, 994 (D.C. 1980); Fiorentino v. A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 416 N.E.2d 998, 1002-03 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981); Shop Rite Foods, Inc. v. Upjohn Co.,
619 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e).
64. 405 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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of a forklift truck. Plaintiff was severly injured when a forklift
truck he was riding acclerated out of control and overturned. A
misadjustment in the governor linkage, performed by a third party
who serviced and maintained the truck, caused the vehicle to accelerate out of control instead of decreasing the vehicle's speed.
Since the misadjustment was foreseeable by the manufacturer, the
product was defective in the absence of a warning that misadjustment of the governor linkage could result in uncontrolled acceleration. The court reasoned:
The environmental approach to product use assumes a manufacturer markets a product for an intended use. This is not to say, however, that in considering .

.

. various instructions and warnings, a

manufacturer may simply close his eyes to hazards associated with
foreseeable misuse of the product ....

When product misuse and

its attendant risks is reasonably foreseeable, the manufacturer is in
the best position to avoid product related injuries .... 68
The duty to warn against the risks of harm from foreseeable improper use or misuse of a product is imposed because of the social
economic rationale underlying the entire concept of strict tort liability. This does not mean, however, that any misuse or environment of use compels a warning.
Only misuses that are commonly associated with and known
about a product require a warning or direction for safe use. Otherwise, the manufacturer is relegated to the role of an insurer.
3. Unusual Susceptibility of Harm in Use of a Product
Notwithstanding that a product may be used without risk of
harm by the majority of foreseeable users, the fact that even a
small group or class possesses an unusual susceptibility or idiosyncratic allergic reaction to a product may precipitate the necessity
for a warning. In Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories," the Texas
Supreme Court observed that an appropriate warning of adverse
reactions to patients possessing an idiosyncratic reaction to the
drug Talwin was imperative. 7 The duty to warn was imposed even
65. Id. at 546.
66. 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
67. Id. at 432. In Tomer v. American Home Prods. Corp., 368 A.2d 35 (Conn. 1976), the

court held the manufacturer of the anesthetic Halothane liable for breach of the duty to
warn users manifesting a hypersensitive reaction even though anesthetic did not tend to
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though plaintiff was one of only a small group of people who possessed an unusual sensitivity to the drug Talwin. The same principle applies when the circumstances under which a product is dangerous may be very limited when compared to the total number of
uses of the product. e
The recent trend has either expressly rejected or simply ignored
the provision articulated in section 402A that a manufacturer is
obligated to warn of dangers only when a substantial number of
the general population is allergic and the seller has reason to foresee the danger. 9 The rationale for imposing a duty to warn on the
product supplier undoubtedly is prompted by the fact that it is the
condition of the product and not the conduct of the supplier that
determines liability. Even if but a few are subjected to potential
significant hazards and dangers that are foreseeable, the product
supplier is obligated to furnish an appropriate warning of the risk
or danger posed by the product.
4.

Unavoidably Unsafe Products

Certain products present dangers that are incapable of being
eliminated. These products are unavoidably unsafe even though
made in the manner intended, contain no impurities, and are marketed in the condition planned. These products can be justifiably
manufactured, notwithstanding the risk involved, because of their
benefits to society and because the alternative to marketing the
product is significantly worse than the risk of harm. As noted in
the commentary to Section 402A of the Restatement, "such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
'
and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."70
produce a reaction in an appreciable number of people. Id. at 40. Similarly, in Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969), the manufacturer was deemed obligated to
warn that a drug might produce an adverse side effect in only a small number of hypersensitive users possessing an idiosyncratic reaction to the drug. Id. at 430.
68. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968); John Norton Farms v. Todagco, 177 Cal. Rptr. 215, 228 (Ct. App. 1981).
69. See Robbins v. Alberto-Culver Co., 499 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Kan. 1972) (two complaints per million bottles presented jury issue whether product supplier could reasonably
foresee that number of people might sustain harm); Erny v. Revlon, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 261,
264 (Mo. 1970) (danger of side effect to one person in 50,000 was sufficient to require supplier to provide warning of risk).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965); see also Brochu v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharma-
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Thus, a manufacturer will not be strictly liable in tort for the unfortunate consequences attending the use of the unavoidably unsafe product provided the product carries an adequate warning.
Most "unavoidably unsafe" products involve drugs. A drug marketed with sufficient warning of its possible adverse effects will not
impose liability against the manufacturer. 7' In determining
whether a drug or similar product is unavoidably unsafe within the
contemplation of the Restatement, the court must, in the first instance, determine whether marketing the product under any circumstances renders it unreasonably dangerous per se. 7 2 A determination that a particular product is unreasonably dangerous per se
is warranted only when the harmful effects of the product both
qualitatively and quantitatively outweight the beneficial effects in
making the product available to the public. 3 If the court concludes
ceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d
429, 432 (Tex. 1974).
71. See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (accompanied by
warning information, the antibiotic Cleocin was not unreasonably dangerous); Dunkin v.
Syntax Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (manufacturer of oral
contraceptive Norinyl 1 + 80 satisfied duty to warn of possible side effect of stroke by
providing warnings in package inserts and leaflets in each package); McDaniel v. McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Neb. 1976) (anesthetic drug Innovar, if properly
prepared and accompanied by proper warnings and instructions, was not unreasonably dangerous). Where, however, the warnings are insufficient to convey the risk of harm from possible side effects, the drug manufacturer may be strictly liable for an inadequate warning.
See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (polio vaccine
manufacturer's lack of adequate warning of potential danger of polio); Tomer v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 368 A.2d 35, 39 (Conn. 1976) (warning required of potential adverse
reactions caused by anesthetic Halothane); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801,
804 (Tex. 1978) (adequate warnings required of side effects of antibiotics neomclin and Kantrex in irrigating surgical wounds).
72. See Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1981); see also
Keeton, Product Liability and The Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973);
Keeton, Products Liability-InadequacyOf Information, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 398, 406 (1970).
73. As noted by the court in Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1981):
[i]f the product is not unreasonably dangerous per se, the court then inquires if the
product is 'unreasonably dangerous as marketed.' According to the Reyes opinion
[498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)], under section 402A and
comment k of the Restatement, a 'seller who has reason to believe that danger may
result from a particular use of his product' must provide an adequate warning. Failure to warn in such circumstances constitutes a defect in the product, making it unreasonably dangerous as marketed.
Id. at 657; see also Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1981);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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that the product is not unreasonably dangerous per se, then, in
effect, the product is unavoidably unsafe and may be marketed
provided the supplier furnishes an adequate warning of the risk of
harm involved in its use.7 4 The failure to provide an adequate
warning of the risk of harm even for an unavoidably unsafe product renders such product unreasonably dangerous and subjects the
75
product supplier to strict tort liability.
An adequate warning for an unavoidably unsafe product must be
reasonable under the circumstances. '6 A warning that is inadequate in factual content, in the expression of material facts, or in
the method by which the warning is conveyed or communicated to
the ultimate user, renders the product unreasonably dangerous despite its beneficial effects to the public. Conversely, a warning
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). The court in Needham
v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1981) recognized a two-step analysis.
"Once it is determined that the product is unavoidably unsafe and that the danger is
warned against, it must be determined whether the product is so unsafe that marketing it at
all is 'unreasonably dangerous per se.' In order to decide whether the product is unreasonably dangerous per se, a court must balance the utility of the product against its dangers."
Id. at 401.
75. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir.) (Sabin polio
vaccine was unreasonably dangerous because of the failure to provide an adequate warning
despite its characterization as an unavoidably unsafe product), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1970) (baseball sunglasses that
would shatter into sharp splinters when hit by baseball were unreasonably dangerous in the
-absence of a warning); Racer v. Johnson & Johnson [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD.
LIAR. REP. (CCH) 1!9082 (Mo. App. 1981) (flammable surgical drape which ignited during
surgery was unreasonably dangerous because of absence of warning of flammable character).

76. See Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1195-96 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). The
court, in connection with the drug neomycin sulfate, following the earlier decision in First
Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc., 537 P.2d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) reaffirmed that an adequate warning of the dangers associated with the drug required that the
warning adequately indicate the scope of danger, reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of the harm that could result from misuse of the drug, the physical aspects of the
warning must adequately alert a reasonably prudent person, a simple directive warning
must indicate the consequences that might result from failure to follow it, and the means
used to convey the warning must be adequate. Id. at 691-93; see also Harless v. BoyleMidway Div. Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir. 1962).
77. An important factor in evaluating adequacy of warning is the clarity of the particular warning. Misleading representations of safety that accompany a warning may render a
warning inadequate or insufficient. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337,
1346 (9th Cir. 1981); American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 404 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980). As stated in Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec., 618 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the warnings must be adequate as to both
form and content.
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that adequately communicates the particular risk of harm in light
of the scientific knowledge available to the supplier at the time of
sale justifies marketing the product.
Generally, a distinction exists between the supplier of highly
beneficial drugs and the supplier of drugs possessing lesser medical
significance. For example, in Calabrese v. Trenton State Colleges
the drug company discharged its duty to warn by furnishing information concerning the possible adverse side effects of an antirabies
vaccine. Significantly, the court determined that there was no duty
to include in the informational data accompanying distribution of
the vaccine statistical information about the remote dangers of a
rabies side effects. 7 ' In Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 80 the court
discussed the absence of any duty to provide a warning of side effects that might ensue from a mixture of dextrose and adrenalin
used in a spinal anesthetic. In Gaston v. Hunter,s1 however, an investigational drug, Chymopapain, was deemed to require a warning
to physician investigators. The rationale for the imposition of the
the drug was not deemed to be critiduty focused on the fact that
82
cally urgent to the public.
Considerable controversy exists whether commercially distributed blood represents a product that invokes application of section
402A. Used for transfusion purposes, blood poses a serious danger
of transferring serum hepatitis. Following the leading case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,8 most jurisdictions have declined
to impose liability on a blood supplier for post transfusion hepatitis. The rationale for rejecting a duty to warn is premised on the
fact that dispensation of blood is more aptly characterized as a service rather than as a sale under the Restatement." The decisions
likewise recognize the realities of the absence of any known scientific procedure that would eliminate the impurity from blood. At
present, numerous states have enacted statutes specifically ex78.
79.
80.
81.

392 A.2d 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
Id. at 604.
502 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd).
588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).

82. Id. at 340.
83. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). Contra Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 899 (I1. 1970).
84. See Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis:An Analysis and a Proposal,24 STAN. L.
REV. 439, 457 (1972); Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction:A Citadel Under Assault, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 13, 28 (1978).
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empting blood suppliers from liability for the transmission of hepatitis through blood serum."'
D. Foreseeability of The Risk of Harm As a Predicate For a
Duty to Warn
The issue of foreseeability of harm as a prerequisite to a duty to
warn constitutes the quintessential issue in a marketing case. The
jurisdictions express divergent views whether foreseeability of the
risk of harm at the time of marketing is a prerequisite to the imposition of strict tort liability.
The Restatement as well as the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions subscribe to the principle that a manufacturer or supplier
of a product is only obligated to warn of dangers that are known or
reasonably foreseeable and anticipated at the time the product is
placed into the stream of commerce.87 Consequently, strict tort liability is inapplicable where the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen by the application of reasonably developed
human skill and foresight the dangers inherent in the product or in
the anticipated use of the product." But where the hazard or risk
of harm is known or reasonably foreseeable or discoverable, the
product is unreasonably dangerous in the absence of a warning or
directions for safe use.
In Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co.,"9 the plaintiff sustained fetal
injuries allegedly caused by the drug Petocin administered to the
mother during delivery. The manufacturer contended that it did
not and could not have reasonably foreseen the adverse side effect
85. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (Deering 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91,
181 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Tzx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-3 (Vernon 1976).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
87. See Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir. 1979) (vaccine manufacturer's knowledge of special risk of harm attendant in normal use of vaccine was requirement for providing warning); Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A., 577 F.2d
968, 977 (5th Cir. 1978) (foreseeability that liquid chemical isobutyl acrylate would spill on a
vessel and injure longshoremen working in area); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383,
1395 (Kan. 1976) (foreseeability that a malodorant could be scrubbed from leaking propane
gas); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981) (warnings to medical
profession summarizing medical information reasonably known by manufacturers at time
Ovulen-21 was prescribed would have been adequate).
88. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp, 528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v.
Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978).
89. 402 N.E.2d 194 (Il. 1980).

§
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of the drug on a fetus. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
a cause of action was not stated under strict tort liability:
We think that the imposition of a knowledge requirement is a
proper limitation to place on a manufacturer's strict liability in tort
predicated upon a failure to warn of a danger inherent in a product.
We do not agree with the plaintiffs that to require knowledge to be
alleged and proved is to infuse negligence principles into strict liability. Indeed, liability based upon a failure to warn adequately of
dangers

. . .

is itself a doctrine borrowed from negligence .

. .

. Yet

the failure-to-warn theory in strict liability has been upheld as a distinguishable doctrine from its counterpart in negligence, based on
the fact that it is the inadequacy of the warning that is looked to,
rather than the conduct of the particular manufacturer to establish
strict liability."0
The foreseeability requirement was later reiterated in Nelson v.
Hydraulic Press Manufacturing Co.," The plaintiff was severely
burned when a plastic injection molding machine spewed metal
plastic as he was attempting to clean the machine. The basis of
plaintiff's cause of action was predicated on a failure to warn of the
risk or hazard in cleaning the machine and instructions for proper
cleaning of the molding machine when blocked by a plastic residue.
The court acknowledged the Woodill requirement that a manufacturer is obligated to provide a warning of dangerous conditions and
risks or hazards only when the manufacturer knows or could reasonably foresee the danger or harm at the time the product is
marketed.92

Foreseeability of risk of harm or unsafe use under the majority
view is measured by information objectively available at the time
the product was manufactured and sold. For example, existing
medical journal articles on the toxic characteristics of a particular
chemical determines the ability to perceive a hazard or danger.
Whether the particular product supplier was aware of information
of the existing risk or hazard at the time of marketing the product
is immaterial since the determination of whether the risk that was
reasonably foreseeable at the time of marketing is imputed to the
90. Id. at 198.
91. 404 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
92. Id. at 1016. Of course, the manufacturer is deemed to possess constructive knowledge of data contained in recognized scientific journals. Allen v. Upjohn, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9173 (Tenn. App. 1982).
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supplier. But the knowledge of dangers and risks of harm is measured by the information available at the time the product is marketed. This limitation may properly be characterized as a form of
state of the art similar to that applied in design defect cases. To
impute knowledge to a manufacturer that could reasonably be
known at the time of trial as distinguished from the time of marketing would impose absolute liability. This standard separates the
duty to warn under strict tort liability from negligence.' 3
Several jurisdictions have abrogated foreseeability as a prerequisite for strict tort liability in a marketing defect case.94 These jurisdictions have intimated that knowledge of the danger and risk of
harm existing at the time of the introduction of the product into
the stream of commerce should be imputed to the product supplier, whether or not the particular dangerous propensities of the
product were reasonably foreseeable or anticipated when the product was marketed. As viewed by the court in Little v. PPG Industries Inc.,95 "strict liability (as distinct from negligence) for a manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings does not depend
on the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger. Such knowledge is
assumed . . . . "s Stated somewhat differently, the imposition of
strict tort liability depends upon a manufacturer's "knowledge or
reasonable imputation of knowledge."' 7 Under the minority ap93. See Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980). The court in
Woodill noted:
We believe our holding in this case is justified because a logical limit must be placed
on the scope of a manufacturer's liability under a strict liability theory. To hold a
manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it would be impossible to
know based on the present state of human knowledge would make the manufacturer
the virtual insurer of the product, a position rejected by this court ....
Id. at 199. See also Allen v. Upjohn Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP.
(CCH) 9173 (Tenn. App. 1982). Some commentators disagree, although they fail to explain
the manner in which a contrary rule would not impose an insurer status on supplier. See
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy Of Information, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 398, 404 (1970).
94. See Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 579 P.2d 940, 946 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978), affd as
modified, 594 P.2d 911 (Wash. 1979). The court stated that "the foreseeability of the dangers involved in the use of the product are not relevant to the strict tort theory, while those
factors are necessary elements of proof of the manufacturer's liability for a negligent failure
to warn adequately of the hazards involved in the use of the product." Id. at 946; see also
Prentice v. Acme Mach. & Supply Co., 601 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Kan. 1979); Racer v. Johnson &
Johnson [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 9082 (Mo. App. 1981).
95. 579 P.2d 940 (Wash. 1978).
96. Id. at 946.
97. See Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 604 P.2d 674, 679 (Colo. 1979). Some courts even
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proach there is no limitation on the supplier's imputed knowledge

as a basis for determining a duty to provide an adequate warning. 8
The elimination of the foreseeability requirement at the time of
marketing judicially metamorphasizes the product supplier into an

insurer against product related accidents. The inquiry may be
posed how a supplier of a product may be expected to warn of the
risk inherent in the use of a product that is both unknown and
technically unknowable at the time the product is marketed. In essence, must a supplier market a product only after an inordinate

delay in experimentation and testing and thereby deprive the public of needed and highly valued products because there may be unknowable side effects or hazards not then reasonably known or scientifically discoverable? Ultimately, the consuming public is
deprived of valuable products because of the product supplier's

concern over absolute liability. The underlying rationale of the minority view appears incongruous with and rather crudely ignores
the literal provisions of comment j of section 402A.
Some jurisdictions have concluded that where the defect in a
product involves a failure to furnish an adequate warning or in-

struction for safe use the action is sustainable under section 388 of
the Restatement." Other jurisdictions, without analysis, perceive
the theories of strict tort liability and negligence (as well as breach
of implied warranty) providing essentially identical standards for
the duty to warn. 100 These jurisdictions perceive that under either
require the trial court to instruct the jury that the dangerous trait of the product is imputed
to the manufacturer. In Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1981), the
New Jersey Supreme Court declared that the trial court must instruct the jury that the
manufacturer is deemed to have known of the harmful propensity of the product. Id. at 931.
98. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1109 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); Berkeblile
v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975); Kimble v. Waste Systems Int'l,
Inc., 595 P.2d 569, 572 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
99. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1969); Torsiello v.
Whitehall Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132, 136-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). As observed
by the court in Yarrow, the two concepts are essentially identical since the effort to warn
must be reasonable under the circumstances. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978,
993 (8th Cir. 1969); cf. Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 929 (N.J. 1981).
100. The courts reason that if the user establishes a right to recover under strict liability he necessarily establishes that the product supplier was negligent. See, e.g., Brezendine
v. Visador Co., 437 F.2d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 1970); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.
Supp. 377, 380 (D. Md. 1975); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 273 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Mich.
1979). Some jurisdictions advocate that the Restatement represents the more appropriate
remedy and basis for imposing liability in a marketing case. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chem.
Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1976); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1317-18
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theory, recovery depends on a subjective determination of what
constitutes a reasonable warning.
III. BASis FoR A MARKETING DEFECT
As noted earlier, the three basis component theories that support an action for a marketing defect are: (1) the failure to provide
any warning of the risk or hazard associated with a product; (2) the
failure to provide an adequate warning of the risk or hazard associated with a product; and (3) the failure to provide proper instructions for safe use and directions for avoiding improper use.101
A.

Absence of Any Warning of the Risk of Harm or Danger

Compelling an appropriate warning are those dangers that are
inherent in the product when used for its intended purpose, those
dangers that are avoidable by taking appropriate precautions and
safeguards in using the product, and lastly, those dangers that
emerge only when the product is used improperly or for an unintended purpose.1 0 2 Where the potentially dangerous propensities
are within the reasonable contemplation and knowledge of the consumer or user, however, the product need not convey any warning.103 Thus, where the risk of harm or danger posed by a product
is neither hidden or latent, the absence of a warning will not
render the product defective.10
In Borel v. FibreboardPaper Products Corp.,105 plaintiff developed mesothelioma allegedly as the result of protracted exposure
to asbestos products. Evidence indicated that medical literature
had established a relationship between mesothelioma and inhalation of asbestos fibers. The court concluded that the manufactur(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
101. See Keeton, Products Liability, Inadequacy Of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REv.
398, 398-99 (1970); see also Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 601 P.2d 298, 300 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1979).
102. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 306
N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 605
(Tex. 1972).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
104. See Osterdorf v. Brewer, 367 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Metal Window
Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
105. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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ers' failure to furnish any warning of the risks involved in working
with asbestos products rendered the products unreasonably
dangerous.' 6
Similarly, in Racer v. Johnson & Johnson,107 the plaintiff, a surgical patient, was severely burned when a disposable drape used in
performing D & C surgery was ignited by a cautery device. The
drape was highly flammable but the manufacturer furnished no
warning of this particular characteristic. Liability would result because of the absence of any warning of this dangerous
propensity.10 8
It is equally clear that the absence of warning must represent a
causative nexus to the injury producing event. Many product related injuries arise from the use of one product in conjunction with
another. For a marketing defect to exist, it must be established
that the product in question was unreasonably dangerous without
a warning and that this absence of warning was a causative factor
in the product user's injury.10 ' In Garman v. American Clipper
Corp.," ' plaintiff purchased a motor home with a propane gas system. Several leaks were detected in the gas system and were taken
to the dealer for repair. A few days later while at a rest stop plaintiff's wife lit the stove and within a few minutes an explosion and
fire occurred. The fire and explosion were caused by ignition of gas
that was leaking from a joint on a gas line extending from a nearby
hot water heater. Plaintiffs contended that the defendant failed to
give adequate warning and installation instructions regarding the
gas stove. In affirming a summary judgment for the manufacturer,
the appellate court stated:
A failure to warn may create liability for harm caused by use of an
unreasonably dangerous product. That rule, however, does not apply
to the facts in this case because it was not any unreasonably dangerous condition or feature of respondent's product which caused the
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1094.
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9082 (Mo. App. 1981).
d. T 9082, at 21, 111.
In a failure to warn situation, a presumption arises that an adequate warning

would have been read, heeded, and the injury producing event averted. See, e.g., Wolfe v.
Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420
A.2d 1305, 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d

602, 604 (Tex. 1972).
110. 173 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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injury. To say that the absence of a warning to check for gas leaks in
other products makes the stove defective is semantic nonsense. The
product here did not cause or create the risk of harm."1 '
This identical rationale was followed in Johnson v. Jones-Blair
Paint Co.112 Plaintiffs sustained burn injuries while removing dried
paint from the floor with gasoline. The gas fumes came in contact
with an open flame of a pilot light and an explosion occurred.
Plaintiffs alleged the manufacturer failed to warn that cleaning
dried paint spots with gasoline was dangerous. The court noted
that paint was not an unreasonably dangerous product and did not
need to carry a warning. Moreover, the court observed that it was
not the dried paint spots but the gasoline that exploded, thus recognizing the absence of a causative nexus to plaintiffs' injuries.11 8
In the absence of any warning, a presumption is created that the
114
ultimate user would have read and heeded an adequate warning.
That presumption, however, does not impose absolute liability but
the burden of going forward with the evidence is simply shifted to
the product supplier."" 8 Once evidence is introduced that an adequate warning would not have averted the injury-producing event,
the presumption disappears. For example, evidence of user incapacity such as blindness, illiteracy, intoxication at the time of use,
irresponsibility or lack of judgment rebuts the presumption.11 6 In
the absence of a presumption, the courts have placed the responsibility to demonstrate that, had a warning been provided, it would
have been considered and heeded. As an example, Greiner v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft '1 7 involved the failure to warn
of the propensity of the particular vehicle to overturn in a sharp
steering maneuver. The plaintiff was required to establish that he
would not have purchased the vehicle in the face of the warning. In
Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 1 a 15-year-old child con111. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
112. 607-S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
113. Id. at 306.
114. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978);
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505, 506 (Vt. 1977).
115. Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505, 506 (Vt. 1977).
116. Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972).
117. 429 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
118. 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
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tracted polio after taking "Type I" vaccine. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff intended to take the vaccine notwithstanding knowledge of the danger that would have been communicated
by a warning of the potential side effects of the vaccine. The court
in Salk v. Alpine Ski Shop, Inc.,"19 emphasized that the plaintiff
was obligated to establish that he would not have skied or that he
would have purchased other types of ski bindings had he been
warned of the propensity of the particular ski bindings not to
release.
B.

Inadequacy of Existing Warning

The vast majority of marketing defect cases involve the adequacy of an existing product warning rather than the total absence
of any warning. Either a diluted or an overly broad warning of
danger exists but in either case the warning fails to focus on the
precise risk of harm involved in the injury-producing event.
A failure to warn adequately of the particular risk of harm may
render a product, otherwise free of defects, unreasonably dangerous within the intendment of strict tort liability.2 0 The ultimate
user must be afforded a fair opportunity to make an informed
choice whether the risk of harm or danger posed by a product outweighs the utility of using the product. This is the rationale that
underlies the entire concept of a marketing defect.
Adequacy must be determined from the facts. In Caplaco One,
Inc. v. Amerex Corp.,' 2 1 a fire extinguisher failed to operate and
extinguish a fire in an apartment building. The maintenance man
had failed to check a pressure gauge on the extinguisher. Embossed on the extinguisher was the warning, in addition to a pressure gauge, "Recharge Immediately After Use." This was deemed a
clear descriptive warning of the danger posed by an underpres-

119. 342 A.2d 622 (R.I. 1975). Moreover, a lack of warning is not the proximate cause of
an injury if the user is aware of the danger which a warning would provide. Strong v. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981).
120. See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (N.M. 1977); Bituminous Casualty
Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Palmer v. Avco Dist. Co., 412 N.E.2d 959 (I1. 1980) a warning plate
which warned users to keep feet and hands away from power driven parts of a fertilizer
spreader was deemed inadequate. Understandably, the court did not declare the contents of
an adequate warning. Id. at 962.
121. 572 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss3/4

30

Sales: The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liabili

1982]

DUTY TO WARN AND INSTRUCT

surized extinguisher that had previously been used."2 '
In general, an adequate warning must communicate with such a
degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable person to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger.1 28 As articulated in Lopez v. ARO Corp.,124 "whether a
warning is legally sufficient depends upon the language used and
the impression that such language is calculated to make upon the
minds of the users of the product."125 Evidence that the user of the
product followed the warnings or instructions but, nevertheless,
sustained an injury constitutes some evidence that the warning or
instruction was inadequate to make the product reasonably safe.12
Adequacy likewise depends on warning of the risk of improper use
or handling of the product. For example, the failure to warn an
ultimate user of the risk of two workers rather than just a single
worker operating a bail cutting machine presents an issue on
s
adequacy 127
Adequacy of a particular warning or instruction for safe use depends on communicating to the ultimate user the particular danger
or risk of harm involved in the use of a product. An adequate
warning is generally measured by a dual standard: (1) Is the warning calculated to reach the user of the product in a form that
would reasonably be expected to catch the attention of a prudent
person in the circumstances or environment of its use; and (2) Is
the warning comprehensible to the average user and does it convey
122. Id. at 636.
123. See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 866, 872
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An adequate warning is one that is calculated to bring home to a reasonably prudent user the nature and extent of the danger involved in the use of the product. See, e.g., Haberly v. Reardon Co., 310 S.W.2d 859, 867
(Mo. 1958); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Trimble v.
Irwin, 441 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).
124. 584 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
125. Id. at 335; accord Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div. Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d 1051,
1054 (5th Cir. 1979); Young v. Reliance Elec. Co., 584 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tenn. App. 1979).
As noted by the court in Selly v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981), "adequacy
of such warnings is measured not only by what is stated but also by the manner in which it
is stated." Id. at 837.
126. See Kritser v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973) (pilot
following instructions contained in operators manual and still experienced an accident).
127. See Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 404 A.2d 1094, 1098 (N.H. 1979). In Marchant v.
Lorain Div. of Koehring, 251 S.E.2d 189 (S.C. 1979) the issue of whether the crane operator
was aware of the tendency of the crane to double block raised an issue on adequacy of the
warning. Id. at 192.
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a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to the mind
of a reasonably prudent person?'1 8 Implicit in this determination is
an evaluation of the clarity with which the particular danger or
risk of harm is communicated to the expected user of the product."2 9 An adequate warning, in essence, must bring home to the
user the specific danger or risk of harm involved in the use of the
product.130
There are instances where adequacy of warning is determined as
a matter of law. As an example, there is no duty on the supplier of
blasting caps to warn of the danger of a spontaneous explosion of a
cap after 30 years of unsupervised storage.131 In these circumstances, the imposition of a duty to furnish full and complete
warnings would be tantamount to the imposition of absolute liability."3 2 The fact that strict liability was never intended to be absolute nor to impose the status of insurer upon the product manufacturer was seemingly ignored under the novel approach followed in
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day.' Plaintiff dropped the revolver he
was unloading in the cab of his pickup truck, causing the gun to
fire and a bullet to strike his leg. The manufacturer had provided a
printed warning in the instruction booklet accompanying the gun
which the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged as sufficient to
alert consumers of the hidden dangers in the use of the revolver.
The court, however, reasoned that the warning would not protect
the inadvertent plaintiff who accidentally dropped the gun:
128. See, e.g., Shop Rite Foods, Inc., v. Upjohn Co., 619 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); Lopez v. ARO Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

129. See, e.g., Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1981);
Borchu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); Fiorentino v. A.E.

Staley Mfg. Co., 416 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
130. See Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). In Murray
v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co., 475 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1973) the warning on the can that adhe-

sive should not be used "near" fire or flame was deemed inadequate to communicate that
vapors from an adhesive could be ignited by an open pilot light. Id. at 132-33. Additionally,
in Tucson Indus., Inc., v. Schwartz, 501 P.2d 936 (Ariz. 1972) the warning on contact cement
was inadequate to alert users that fumes from the cement could potentially produce blindness. Id. at 941. A warning that is delayed, reluctant in tone or lacking in a sense of urgency
may be inadequate. See Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981).
131. Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
132. Id. at 343.
133. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979).
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Where the most stringent warning does not protect the public,
the defect itself must be eliminated if the manufacturer is to avoid
liability ....
Although in certain cases an adequate warning may
prevent a product from being deemed defective, the instant case was
not of that type."3 '
In essence, the product was adjudged to be unreasonably dangerous per se. This decision in effect imposes a form of absolute liability on the manufacturer.
A presumption is created when an adequate warning has been
supplied with the product that the user will heed and comply with
reasonable warnings.1ss A product supplier is entitled to rely on the
ultimate user reading and following adequate warnings that accompany a product. Even when an inadequate warning exists, it nonetheless cannot proximately cause an injury when the user fails to
read or heed the warning or directions for use."' It is axiomatic
that the lack of a satisfactory communication of the risk of danger
or hazard must present a causative nexus to the injury-producing
event.

C. Lack of Directions or Instructions for Safe and Effective
Use

Mere directions for the proper use of the product which fail to
warn of specific dangers and risks of harm if the directions are not

followed may not satisfy this marketing requirement. 1 s7 Conversely, the mere fact that the ultimate user is apprised of a poten134. Id. at 44.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). In Hudgens v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 393 So. 2d 940, 944 (La. Ct. App. 1981), the court determined that automotive battery warning was adequate as a matter of law and stated "If
plaintiff had obeyed the warning this unfortunate accident would not have occurred." Id. at
944. See generally Reeves v. Power Tools, Inc., 474 F.2d 375, 379 (6th Cir. 1973); Caplaco
One, Inc. v. Amerex Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 634 (8th
Cir. 1978); Young v. Reliance Elec. Co., 584 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
136. See Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Hertron Chem. Co., 229 S.E.2d 681,
683 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1972).
But see Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962) (failure to read warning accompanying Old English Oil Furniture Polish could not insulate manufacturer from
'liability under Virginia negligence law where warning deemed inadequate).
137. See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (instructions to use protective shield on a
high speed grinder is inadequate to warn the user of the danger in failing to follow directions for use).
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tial risk of harm in the use of a product may not enable the user to
avoid that risk in the absence of directions or instructions for
properly and safely utilizing the product.
Directions for use serve purposes distinct from warnings. Directions basically instruct the user of the product in the proper and
efficient use of the product and the proper manner to avoid unsafe
uses while warnings communicate the dangers inherent in the use
of the product. 1 8 Stated differently, warnings focus on avoiding
unsafe use while instructions seek to insure safe and appropriate
use.

13 9

Mere direction for use may or may not satisfy the duty to warn.
As noted in Harris v. Northwest Gas Co.,14 0 "[t]he distinction between instructions and warnings become important when instructions alone are given and the issue is whether warnings are also
required for safe use."' In Schmidt v. PlainsElectric, Inc.,14 2 the
manufacturer's instruction booklet accompanying its electric wallheater furnished information that to obtain maximum efficiency
and economy of operation it was important not to block the air
inlet or outlet. Such instructions, however, pertained merely to attaining optimum operation of the product and failed to warn of the
potential fire hazard created in installing the heater behind fabric
,3
drapes.
A manufacturer may additionally be required to furnish a warning concerning the potential risk of harm in the event the instructions or directions accompanying the product are disregarded. As
stated by the court in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.,1 44 "We
138. Id. at 873; see also D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 110 (N.J. Super. Law
Div. 1973) (duty to warn not discharged by mere presence of directions for use no matter
how clear). For a general discussion of the distinction, see Dillard & Hart, Product Liability:
Directions For Use And The Duty To Warn, 41 VA. L. Rsv. 145, 172-73 (1955).
139. See Harris v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 588 P.2d 18, 20 n.3 (Or. 1978).

140. 588 P.2d 18 (Or. 1978).
141. Id. at 20 n.3; see also Lopez v. ARO Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court in Lopez noted that the statement
"[wihen used as a grinder: 'The tool should never be operated with the guard removed,'
could reasonably be considered a warning of the danger of using the tool as a grinder without a guard rather than merely a direction for its use." Id. at 336. See generally Fiorentino
v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 416 N.E.2d 998, 1002-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Wolfe v. Ford Motor
Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 145-46 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
142. 281 N.W.2d 794 (N.D. 1979).
143. Id. at 799-800.
144. 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
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think that the duty to warn may not be satisfied by directions
which merely tell how to use the product, but say nothing about
the inherent and specific dangers if the directions are not
followed." 1 5
146
In Anderson v. Heron Engineering Co.,
a ski instructor fell

thirty feet to the ground and was injured when the cable clamp
unit securing his chair to the chair lift failed. Despite the fact that
the manufacturer had supplied a maintenance manual to the lift
operator containing instructions for the proper torque to be applied to the clamp unit, the manufacturer was deemed liable for
failing to warn of the consequences that would result from noncompliance.

147

In Kerns v. Engelke,148 plaintiff was struck in the eye while assisting in setting up a longhopper forage blower, which is powered
by a power take-off assembly (PTO) attached at one end to the
forage blower, and, at the other end, to the power take off of a
tractor. The PTO must be disconnected from the tractor whenever
the forage blower is moved, but need not be removed from the forage blower. An instruction manual accompanying the forage blower
contained pictures entitled "Method of Transport," depicting the
forage blower with its PTO removed. Rejecting the assertion that
the pictures conveyed an adequate warning (based on the adage
"one picture is worth a thousand words"), the court stated, "[a]t
most, however, the pictures merely informed the reader of the
manual that the PTO could be removed, not that failure to do so
was dangerous.'' 9
Similarily, in Anderson v. Klix Chemical Co., 80 directions on
the label to dilute a cleaning solution were insufficient to warn of
the dangers that would result in the event the user failed to dilute
the solution as specified. Additionally, in Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp.,1"5 an instruction calling for the tightening of lug nuts on a
145. Id. at 988.
146. 604 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1979).
147. Id. at 679.
148. 369 N.E.2d 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), aff'd as modified, 390 N.E.2d 859 (I1. 1979).
149. Id. at 1291.
150. 472 P.2d 806 (Or. 1970); accord Brizendine v. Visador Co., 437 F.2d 822, 828 (9th
Cir. 1970).
151. 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975). But in Ford Motor Co. v. McCamish, 559 S.W.2d 507
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977), the court declared that the manufacturer was not required to give
torque ratings on wheel bolts to individuals experienced in tire assembly and the mounting
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wheel assembly to specified foot pounds of torque did not provide
an appropriate warning of the hazard that would occur in the
event the instructions were ignored. A product supplier is not oblilgated to include directions in its service manual of the torque
rating for bolts where the danger to person reasonably expected to
perform this type of repair was unforeseeable by the
manufacturer.

162

Instructions for safe operation and use of a product are likewise
essential where hazards may arise from an improper but reasonably foreseeable use of the product. 8 This requirement is especially
pertinent and essential for technically complex products. In Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co.,15 4 the court acknowledged the applicability

of strict tort liability against the supplier of a toy telescope purchased on behalf of a minor child who suffered eye injuries while
using the improperly assembled product to view the sun. The court
noted that the product was "a technically complex product intended for use by technically unsophisticated consumers, to be assembled and used by them in accordance with instructions prepared and supplied by the technically knowledgeable supplier." 53
The court concluded that the supplier should know that the instructions furnished would form the unsophisticated consumers'
only guide to assembly and proper use of the telescope. Consequently, the supplier was obligated to compose and furnish a set of
directions and instructions that would adequately guide the ultimate user from the pitfall of the danger of improper
construction. 156
of vehicle tires in the automotive field. Id. at 511-12.
152. See Ford Motor Co. v. McCamish, 559 S.W.2d 507, 511-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
153. See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. 1972) (danger from
connecting freon can to the high pressure side of an air conditioning compressor); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (danger in failing to use a safety on a cuprock grinding
wheel).
154. 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544
P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975), the court emphasized that instructions prescribing proper maintenance of a motor home did not necessarily satisfy the duty to warn of the danger in the
event of the failure of such maintenance. Id. at 988.
155. Migley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). The court
noted that "it begs the obvious to say that the supplier knows or reasonably should know
that the directions furnished by him will form the unsophisticated consumer's only guide to
assembly and use." Id. at 221.
156. Id. at 221.
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Instructions for safe handling may even be necessary to those
experienced in the normal use or handling of a product. In Frazier
v. Kysor Industrial Corp.,15 7 plaintiff, an expert in the moving of
heavy equipment, was injured while moving a four ton transverse
saw. The manufacturer was held liable for the failure to provide
instructions for the safe and proper method of moving the saw.
This duty, therefore, is not satisfied by furnishing warning of dangers inherent only in the intended uses of a product.'" The warnings must anticipate foreseeable handling, moving and installation
of equipment and products. This constitutes but an obvious recognition of the need to warn and furnish instructions for a product in
its various foreseeable environments.
IV.

A.

PREREQUISITES OF AN ADEQUATE WARNING OR INSTRUCTION
FOR SAFE USE

In General

The essential elements of a legally adequate warning or instruction for safe use were clearly articulated by the court in Bituminous Casualty Corp. v.Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.159 An
adequate warning or instruction is one that (1) would reasonably
be expected to catch the attention of a reasonably prudent person
in the circumstances of its use and (2) would be understandable in
content and convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of
the danger to the reasonably prudent person. The sufficiency of a
warning is dependent upon both the language used and the impression that the language is calculated to make upon the mind of
the average user of the product.160
The adequacy of a warning or an instruction for safe use generally constitutes a fact issue that must be resolved by the trier of
fact. ' This general rule was reaffirmed in Bryant v. Technical Re157. 607 P.2d 1296 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
158. Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
159. 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
160. Id. at 872-73; accord Harless v. Boyle- Midway Div. Am. Home Prods., 594 F.2d
1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979); Michael v. Warner/Chilicott, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App.
1978); Shop Rite Foods, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 619 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. See Berry v. Coleman Sys. Co., 596 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). The
court declared, "the trial court may rule as a matter of law that warnings are inadequate
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search Co.'6 2 In reviewing a summary judgment in favor of the

manufacturer, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the summary
judgment procedure is ordinarily improper to dispose of the issue
of warning adequacy. Rather, because of the unique circumstances
of each case, warning adequacy is best reserved for determination
by the jury.""
when, and only when, the danger is clearly latent. In all other cases, the adequacy of both
the content and prominence of warnings accompanying a product is a question for the jury
and the court need not furnish guidelines to aid the jury in its determination." Id. at 1369;
see, e.g., Brownlee v. Louisville Varnish Co., 641 F.2d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1981) (fact issue
whether warning affixed to aerosal paint can was adequate in the absence of instructions for
safe disposal of the product); Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 573
(5th Cir. 1979) (adequacy of warning of potential fuel leakage which was published in ordinary print and contained on page 13 of owner's manual presented an issue for the jury);
Lopez v. ARO Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (warning given in an operator's manual that accompanied product presented fact issue for jury in determining adequacy of warning). The rule that the adequacy of a warning
presents a fact issue is followed in several jurisdictions. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chem.
Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) (fact issue was presented where warnings affixed
both to 55 gallon drum and contained in safety data sheets conveyed sufficient warnings of
dangerous propensities of trichloroethylene when used to clean and degrease helicopter
parts); LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253, 257 (W.D. La. 1978)
(warning by manufacturer of vehicle that "continuous driving over 90 miles per hour requires using high-speed-capability tires" was inadequate where manufacturer knew that
tires were designed for maximum operating speed of 85 miles per hour), aff'd, 623 F.2d 985
(5th Cir. 1980); Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 703, 708 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (warnings printed on dashboard of "trackster" was insufficient to inform the user of
serious likelihood of overturning forward because of vehicles' weight distribution); Ebbert v.
Vulcan Iron Works, Inc., 409 N.E.2d 112, 113 (III. App. Ct. 1980) (whether warning in field
manual accompanying pile drive was sufficient to warn of potential danger from possible.
disconnection of air hose or whether warning was required affixed to machine itself
presented jury question); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978) (fact issue was raised where information that was printed in owner's manual and furnished with vehicle on rating plate affixed to door provided adequate instruction and warning that gross vehicle weight and weight requirements posed a danger when used as portable
camper); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc.,537 P.2d 682, 691 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1975) (fact question was presented whether warning on tag and label accompanying
liquid sold for disinfectant was adequate to warn of the danger of human consumption of
hogs fed grain treated with the disinfectant); Spencer v. Nelson Sales Co., 620 P.2d 477, 482
(Okla. Ct. App. 1980) (fact issue whether insulated underwear unreasonably dangerous absent label warning as to its extreme flammability); Reiger v. Toby Enters., 609 P.2d 402, 404
(Or. Ct. App. 1980) (a fact issue existed concerning the adequacy of warning placard placed
on meat slicer).
162. 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
163. Id. at 1344-45. The Ninth Circuit stressed that adequacy is rarely a subject for
summary judgment, but rather generally constitutes an issue to be resolved by a jury. Id. at
1344-45; accord Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Ill. 1980); Richards v.
Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Reiger v. Toby Enters., 609 P.2d
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B. Factors that Establish Adequacy
There are several important considerations that directly affect
the adequacy of a warning or instruction for safe use. These considerations include the conspicuousness of the warning or instruction on the product, the size and type of print used to communicate the warning or instruction, the location of the warning or
instruction on the product, the manner in which the warning or
instruction is affixed to the product, and the manner in which the
warning and directions for use are communicated to the ultimate
user.
1. Conspicuousness of the Warning
The warning or instruction must be prominent. Cautionary
words printed in the body of other information of the same size
and color generally are insufficient.'" Rather, the warning must be
printed on the label in such a manner as to assure that a user's
attention will be attracted. 1 ' The design of the product itself may
constitute the warning. For example, a shield over a starter switch
may constitute a warning of the danger of an inadvertent startup,1 66 or a malodorant added to odorless gas may constitute the
17
warning of the hazard or risk.1
2.

Use of Symbols Rather Than Words

Symbols such as skull and crossbones may be necessary to constitute an adequate warning when the written word alone would be
incomprehensible to foreseeable users. For example, a product anticipated for use by children or individuals unable to read or write
English may require universally recognized symbols of the particular hazard or danger involved. 16 The duty to furnish this type
402, 405 (Or. 1980); Le Marbe v. Dow Chem. Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAS.
REP. (CCH) 9179 (I11.App. 1981).
164. See Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421, 428 (Idaho 1974).

165. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962); Shell Oil Co. v.
Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271, 281-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
166. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814, 820 (4th Cir. 1966).
167. Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1392 (Kan. 1976).
168. See Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965) (required warning in Spanish or by international symbols to foreseeable users of Hispanic ori.
gin who could not read or understand the printed word in English). But see Pierluisi v. E.R.
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warning necessarily involves not only the type of product but,
more importantly, the foreseeable intended uses and the environment of use of the product.6 9
3.

Communication of the Risk of Harm

A warning must sufficiently convey the risk of danger associated
with the product. The warning must be qualitatively sufficient to
impart the particular risk of harm. In Fiorentino v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 1 70 the court emphasized that this represents a more substantial requirement than the mere size of type or number of exclamation points contained in a warning. Plaintiffs were carpenters
who were burned in a flash fire while using a contact adhesive to
install formica in a kitchen. Vapors from the adhesive, which were
heavier than air, moved along the kitchen floor and became ignited
by a closed oven pilot light. The pilot light was located eight feet
from the adhesive and was concealed from view. A label on the
adhesive container carried a warning "CAUTION: FLAMMABLE

MIXTURE. DO NOT USE NEAR FIRE OR FLAME" and also
"Keep Away from Heat, Sparks and Open Flame." The Court acknowledged that the warning was inadequate to alert even a professional user concerning the danger of using this flammable con71
tact adhesive near a closed and concealed pilot light.1
Similarly, in Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,' 7 1 the warning
that "hammer face may chip if struck against another hammer,
hard nails, or other hard objects possibly resulting in eye or other
Squibb & Sons, 440 F. Supp. 691, 695 (D. P.R. 1977) (warning printed in Spanish not essential for adequate notice of potential risk of harm notwithstanding that product supplier
could foresee that many users could neither read nor understand English).
169. For example, products expected to be used by individuals not familiar with a product may require a symbol or picture rather than mere written words. Recently, in Ziglar v.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 280 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), use of the words:
"dangerous-poison" and accompanied by red skull and crossbone symbols placed on a
container of clear liquid crop poison that was similar in appearance to water was not adequate warning as a matter of law. The court noted that the manufacturer should have added
a coloration to the poison to distinguish it from water. Id. at 515-16.
170. 416 N.E.2d 998 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
171. Id. at 1003. The court acknowledged as a well settled principle of law that a manufacturer who undertakes to warn any user of the proper method of handling a product must
provide complete and accurate warnings of any inherent risks in that use. Id. at 1003; accord Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Ill.
1980) (warning must delineate
the specific risk or danger presented in use of product).
172. 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
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bodily injury" was insufficient without an additional warning that
the hammer, once chipped, must be discarded. 17 8 In Little v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 4 a label containing the words "vapor may be
deadly" in red lettering and the phrase actually on the label "use
with adequate ventilation" was deemed insufficient to communicate the particular danger. The court noted that the use of skull
and cross bones appearing in a conspicuous place with a yellow
background would have been more appropriate as well as a label
containing such wording as "very dangerous", "highly
toxic," "poi75
sonous" or "vapor fumes dangerous if inhaled.'
Likewise, a "caution" may be inadequate when the magnitude of
the potential harm requires a warning of "danger". In Johnson v.
Husky Industries, Inc.,' a caution to use charcoal only in ventilated areas was not adequate to warn of the risk of burning charcoal indoors. In Eddleman v. Scalco,1 7 the word flammable affixed
to a product was deemed inadequate when the real danger posed
by the product was its explosive characteristics.
A warning that adequately communicates the danger relieves the
manufacturer of the obligation to provide any additional warnings. 17 8 An otherwise proper warning which adequately communicates the particular risk of harm need not always be conveyed directly to the individual consumer. 7 9 This situation exists when the
ultimate user is not in a position to comprehend or prevent the
danger. For example, in LaBelle v. McCauley Industrial Corp., 80
the owner of a twin engine aircraft sued the manufacturer of the
aircraft's dual blade propeller on a failure to warn. Plaintiff asserted that a direct warning was required to alert the aircraft owner of the risk that the starboard propeller could break off and slice
into the fuselage. The manufacturer contended that it discharged
173. Id. at 928.
174. 579 P.2d 940 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd as modified, 594 P.2d 911 (Wash. 1979).

175. Id. at 943.
176. 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976).
177. 484 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934, 938 (N.M. 1977) (crane supplier was
not obligated to install optional alarm warning system where adequate warning was pro-

vided to keep crane away from high voltage lines).
179. A warning or directions regarding the proper loading of an aircraft is designed to
inform the owner and operator of an aircraft and not the passengers. Stevens v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 170 Cal.Rptr. 925, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
180. 649 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1981).
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its duty by inserting a warning in the service manual apprising aircraft repair stations of the necessity of rounding and polishing
sharp corners of the hub as a method to prevent breakage of the
propeller. The propeller manufacturer acknowledged that its warning was indirect, yet nevertheless adequate to convey the risk of
the propeller breakage. An indirect warning may suffice, even
though it does not apprise the ultimate purchaser, as long as the
warning eliminates excessive preventable danger. However, an indirect notice contained in the service manual that in the first instance fails to communicate the risk of propeller breakage is
inadequate. 181
4.

Location of the Warning

A product representing a high risk of harm may be made to
carry an understandable message on the product itself either by
label or similar device. 182 In Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., 8 plaintiff was injured when he accidentally tipped over
his motorcycle while cleaning it in the basement of his home. The
fuel switch had not been turned to the off position and gas that
leaked from the tank was ignited by the pilot light of a nearby
water heater. The plaintiff contended that the motorcycle Was defective due to a failure to warn of the dangerous nature of the fuel
switch on the motorcycle. The Fifth Circuit noted:
The manual containing the warning was in evidence, and the
jury could determine whether putting the warning on page 13 in ordinary type was an adequate effort and whether the warning so located was sufficient to warn users of the danger. There is no merit to
the assertion that the evidence does not support a finding of failure
to warn.
Defendant's major point is a contention that plaintiff is barred
under cases holding that, as a matter of law, failure to read a label is
181. Id. at 49.
182. See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 1975)
(required warning to be impressed on the rim parts), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); West
v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 213 (Iowa 1972) (metal cable should have
had rating tag affixed directly to cable rather than merely prescribing rating capacity in
attached pamphlet); Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex. 1977)
(warning label should be attached to commercial washer rather than placed in operator's
manual detached from product).
183. 608 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1979).
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contributory negligence. These cases involve failure to read labels
attached to the product. Here the warning is on page 13 of the owner's manual in ordinary type. Whether a warning is physically attached to a product has been held to be of significance in many
cases from other jurisdictions."8 '
When the magnitude of the danger is extremely severe, a warning properly placed on the product, together with warnings con-

tained within the product owner's manual, may be required. 8 As

an example, in Gordon v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works,186
plaintiff suffered an amputation of four fingers when a punch press

unexpectedly recycled. The court observed that instructions and
warnings in a service manual were no substitute for a warning attached to the press.187 Similarly, in Russell v. G.A.F. Corp.,18 8 the

court indicated that the manufacturer of asbestos ceiling sheets
did not discharge its duty by distributing an informational booklet

which accompanied bundles of the sheets and stated that grids distributing stress should be used underneath the material. Likewise,
in Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,' s9 a tire manufacturer's

catalogue warning that a mismatched rim assembly could cause a
tire to explode was insufficient in the absence of a warning imprinted directly on the tire. In some instances, however, instructions and warnings contained in manuals that accompany particular
products, even in the absence of a direct label affixed to the
product,
satisfies the duty to warn. 190
184. Id. at 573.
185. Cf. Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (court
concluded warning placed in owner's manual and placement of rating plate on truck door to
warn of serious accident which could result from blowout did not foreclose the issue of adequacy of warning).
186. 574 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1978).
187. Id. at 1187. The court noted that a warning in the service manual would not reach
the ultimate press user. The court was influenced by an assumption that the engineering
department would generally retain the manual and, therefore, any warnings contained in the
manual would not be calculated to reach the user of the product. Id. at 1186; accord Air
Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(court upheld jury finding of necessity for warning label to be affixed to incubator used in
hospital).
188. 422 A.2d 989 (D.C. App. 1980).
189. 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
190. See, e.g., Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976) (instruction sheets and label affixed to grinding machine was deemed adequate to support a directed verdict for defendant); Beier v. International Harvester Co., 178 N.W.2d 618, 620
(Minn. 1970) (manual sufficiently explained the proper procedure for mounting truck wheels
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The location of a warning on the product is particularly important. A warning affixed to a product at a location not calculated to
catch the eye of the user may be deemed inadequate."'
5.

Clear and Unambiguous Warning

Whether a warning adequately makes a user aware of the danger
or its potential severity depends on the language used and the impression that it is calculated to make upon the mind of the average
user of the product. This necessarily involves questions of display,
syntex and emphasis.192 A warning must be neither ambiguous nor
vague in its content. In Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana S.A., 1 the word "prolonged" in the phrase "avoid prolonged
breathing" of vapors was deemed ambiguous. ' Similarly, a warning to use the drug Kantrex on a one-time basis only for post-surgical irrigation was not sufficiently clear to communicate the hazard to the physician that repeated use of Kantrex in irrigating
surgical wounds could cause an ototoxic condition.' 95 The warnings
must bring home to the user the particular danger or risk of harm
presented by the product.
6.

Sufficiently Broad and Encompassing Warning

A warning, in order to be appropriate and adequate, must not be
unduly narrow and limited in scope.1 96 The rule that a warning
although the user did not actually read the manual); Lopez v. ARO Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333,
337 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (instruction for proper uses of
grinder contained in accompanying manual sufficient for providing warning).
191. See American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 404 N.E.2d 606, 615 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (small tag on safety glasses placed in location unlikely to attract user's attention was
inadequate); Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 218 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Wis. 1974) (warning on
crop blower located at ankle height was not adequate).
192. See Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571, 573 n.4 (5th Cir.
1979); D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 110 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973).
193. 577 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978).
194. Id. at 979; see also Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir.
1973) (warning to avoid "prolonged" operation in a slip or slide under low fuel conditions
was too vague to adequately inform the pilot of the particular hazard).
195. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978) (warning to
doctors in the PDR on the use of the drug Kantrex was too vague because it failed to warn
against the danger of repeated irrigation of a surgical wound when one-time only post-surgical irrigation was considered safe).
196. See Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cir. 1976); Schering v.
Geisecke, 589 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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must be sufficiently broad to convey the risk of harm encompasses
the obligation to instruct both as to the safe and proper use and
the proper method of disposal of the product. In Brownlee v. Louisville Varnish Co., 19 7 a five-year-old boy was seriously burned

when an aerosol paint can exploded as he lit a fire in a trash
container. The can had been discarded and placed in the family
trash receptacle by the boy's mother the previous day. Affixed to
the aerosol paint can was the warning "READ DIRECTIONS
CAREFULLY! . .

.

DO NOT USE OR STORE IN AREAS

WHERE HEAT ABOVE 120F, SPARKS OR OPEN FLAME
MAY BE PRESENT. DO NOT PUNCTURE OR INCINERATE.
EXPOSURE TO HEAT OR PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO
SUN MAY CAUSE BURSTING .-.. EXTREMELY FLAMMA-

BLE. Product disposal falls within the realm of intended or foreseeable use since a spent or used up product must inevitably be
discarded. A warning that fails to apprise users of the danger of
disposing of the container without first ascertaining that it is
empty, is too narrow to convey the risk of harm associated with the
product. The court stated:
[I]f the risk of explosion and spraying of hot burning paint could
have been diminished or eliminated by emptying the can of unused
paint and reducing the pressure inside it prior to disposal, an aspect
unanswered by counsel at oral argument, then a jury might conclude
that the warning placed on the can was also inadequate. 1 "
The view in Brownlee that the product supplier's duty to warn
of dangers inherent in the use of a product includes the subsidiary
duty to provide directions and warning for safe disposal is particularly pertinent in relation to household products where the exposure of children is a distinct possibility. 1 "9Although a warning regarding proper disposal would appear to be less crucial in an
industrial setting, some jurisdictions have deemed a disposal warning necessary where the disposed product involved a significant
danger.2 00
197. 641 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981).
198. Id. at 401.

199. See Tucci v. Bossert, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (adequate warning for disposal of Drano can).
200. See Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (warning as
to safe disposal of empty drums of industrial solvent Xylene).
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7. Undiluted Warning
Over promotion of a product and other activities of a manufacturer calculated to dilute warnings may emasculate an otherwise
legally sufficient warning. Over-promotion of prescriptive drugs
may be directed to induce physicians to focus only on the beneficial aspects of the drugs and to ignore the potential side effect.
In Salmon v. Parke-Davis& Co., 20 1 the manufacturer of the drug

Chloromycetin furnished plaintiff's physician a desk calendar advertising the drug along with a sample package containing a warning about the drug. The Court observed that the calendar might
remain on the physician's desk long after the sample and its warning had been discarded, thereby effectively nullifying a valid warning in the package.2 2 Similarly, advertising promotions concerning
the safety aspects of a product are relevant to the issue of the adequacy of a warning of the risk.2

V. Focus
A.

OF THE

DUTY

TO WARN OR INSTRUCT

Duty to the Ultimate User or Consumer

Generally, the duty to warn extends to and must be reasonably
calculated to reach the ultimate user or consumer of the product.10 4 The class of ultimate consumers or users to whom a duty is
201. 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
202. Id. at 1363; accord Stevens v. Parke-Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr.
45, 53 (Cal. 1973).
203. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 903 (Pa. 1975); American
Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 404 N.E.2d 606, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Advertising safety
glasses as "Sure-Guard" and "Super Armorplate" represented to the user that the glasses
offered the highest degree of protection and offset a miniscule warning that "lenses are impact resistant but not unbreakable." American Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 404 N.E.2d 606,
617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). In Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), the court concluded that the warning of the dangers of Sabine polio vaccine must reach the patient during distribution in a mass immunization program where the product supplier could perceive
that the vaccine would be distributed without a learned intermediary evaluating the potential risk of harm. Id. at 1276. Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), held that warning that
fumes from an epoxy paint could ignite or explode when used in a confined area must be
calculated to reach the ultimate user of the product, i.e., the painters using the epoxy paint.
The duty to warn the ultimate user is not abrogated by the fact that others in the distributive chain likewise have a duty to warn. Id. at 814.
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owed extends to the class or group reasonably expected to come in
contact with the product as it proceeds to its ultimate
destination. 0 8
The duty to warn corresponds to the knowledge of the product
danger possessed by the supplier relative to the ultimate user.
Generally, the duty arises where there is unequal knowledge. For
example, in Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels,2 06 the manufacturer of football helmets worn by high school players was held
liable for a failure to warn that the helmet would not protect
against head injuries. The court reasoned that the manufacturer
possessed superior knowledge of the limitations of the product on
its protective ability.207 The manufacturer of automobile jacks in
Illinois State Trust Co. v. Walker Manufacturing Co.,s08 was obligated to warn the ultimate user of the risks involved in positioning
all four jackstands with the "weak" sides pointed in the same direction. The existence of an unequal knowledge between the manufacturer and the average repairmen of the risk of danger occasioned by the highly unstable condition of an improperly
positioned jack mandated a warning.'" Similarly, in Chappuis v.
Sears Roebuck & Co.,' 1 0 the superior knowledge of the danger possessed by the manufacturer and retailer that a chipped hammer
was susceptible to further chipping imposed on the supplier a duty
to warn of this risk. Dangers and risks generally known to the
user's particular trade or profession, however, eliminate the necessity of a warning. 11
205. See, e.g., Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana S. A., 577 F.2d 968, 977 (5th
Cir. 1978) (longshoreman loading chemicals injured by inhalation of isobutyl acrylate
fumes); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Al E. & C., Ltd., 539 F.2d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 1976) (the manu-

facturer was obligated to instruct and warn bailee of large coal box of the dangers associated

with its handling); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (manufacturer was obligated to warn repairman

and mechanic of the dangers in effectuating repairs on spring-loaded air cylinder where the
mechanic was not familiar with the internal mechanism of product).

206. 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
207. Id. at 439.

208. 392 N.E.2d 70 (II. App. Ct. 1979).
209. Id. at 73-74.

210. 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978).
211. See Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 280 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Wis. 1979) (there is no duty
to warn members of trade or profession of dangers that are generally known and recognized

by that particular trade or profession). This is a generally recognized principle in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 595 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1979); Marti-
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B. Marketing to Group Expected to Supervise Product Use
The distributive chain of product supply may alter the duty to
warn. Thus, the duty to warn may be imposed on the intermediate
consumer, purchaser, user or supplier who is expected to supervise
the use of the product. For example, the manufacturer of an aircraft is not required to warn passengers of an aircraft, the ultimate
consumers, concerning the overload potential of the aircraft. The
manufacturer discharges it duty by providing a warning to the pi12
lot in the owner's manual.2

Similarly, the duty to warn may properly be allocated to an intermediate employer who purchases the product and uses it in the
normal course of business. In McWaters v. Steel Service Co.,21 s an
employee of a construction company was fatally injured when a
bundle of steel rods being used in the construction of a bridge collapsed. A supplier of basic construction materials possessing no
control over the manner in which the materials are used was not
obligated to warn the ultimate user of the danger of using the
materials without proper safeguards. The duty to warn appropriately rests with the experienced bridge contractor employer.214 The
court in Schmeiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 11 recognized that warnings
and instructions furnished to the contractor regarding assembly of
its joist insulated the manufacturer from an action in strict tort
liability for an injury to the contractor's employee precipitated by
a falling joist. Similarly, in Reed v. Pennwalt Corp.," the manufacturer of caustic soda used in a food processing plant was not
required to warn potato trimmer plant employees of the hazards of
nez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1976); Posey v. Clark Equip. Co.,
409 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1969). But see Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 144,
147 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977) (imposes the duty to warn experienced electricians of uninsulated
wires located in control panel box based on the unequal knowledge rationale).
212. See Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 170 Cal. Rptr. 925, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
213. 597 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1979). The courts recognize that a manufacturer may, under
appropriate circumstances, rely on the employer purchaser of a product to supervise its employees in the proper and safe use of the product. See Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623
F.2d 882, 886 (4th Cir. 1980). The same rule is applied to adequate warnings furnished a
physician. See Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 400 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
214. McWaters v. Steel Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1979).
215.540 P.2d 998 (Or. 1975).
216. 591 P.2d 478 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
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the use of its product.2 1 Rather, a warning to the processor satisfied the duty of warning the plant employees.
Jurisdictions express divergent views whether a duty to warn of
risks involved in the use of industrial equipment exists. One view
recognizes that a warning to an intermediate employer discharges
the manufacturer's duty.2 18 As an example, in Shanks v. A.F.E. Industries, Inc." 9 plaintiff, a grain elevator employee sustained severe leg injury when the elevator he was repairing became activated. Plaintiff complained of the lack of instructions or warning
concerning the automatic characteristic of the dryer. The Indiana
appellate court concluded that the manufacturer discharged its
duty by warning the plaintiff's employer.2 0 The grain elevator employer was obligated to instruct and properly warn his employee
since the employer controlled the work space, the employment and
placement of personnel and controlled operation of the grain dryer.
The opposite approach was adopted in Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw,
Inc.,"' Plaintiff's husband was fatally injured when struck by a
board that was forcibly ejected from a lumber machine manufactured by the defendant. A representative of the defendant responsible for installing the saw cutting machine had orally warned the
plant superintendent and manager not to operate the device without its antikickback fingers in place. The decedent, however, had
removed the anti-kickback fingers prior to the accident. The Eight
Circuit stated:
When a manufacturer can reasonably foresee that the warnings
it gives to a purchaser of its product will not be adequately conveyed to probable users of the product, then its duty to warn may
extend beyond the purchaser to those persons foreseeably endangered by the products used. Warnings given to the purchaser do not
necessarily insulate
the manufacturer from liability to injured users
2
of the product. "
217. Id. at 480; see also Little v. PPG Indus., 579 P.2d 940, 947 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)

(ample evidence that failure to warn plaintiff's employer of dangers of solvent inhalation
was intervening cause sufficient to isolate solvent manufacturer from liability for failure to
warn the plaintiff employee).

218. See Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Ky. 1976); Temple v.
Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ohio 1977).

219. 403 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
220. Id. at 857.
221. 630 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1980).
222. Id. at 619.
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Similarily, in Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co.,2 33 the manu-

facturer of a sausage stuffing machine was required to warn the
ultimate user notwithstanding an adequate warning to the industrial purchaser of the equipment.2 4 Product repair or maintenance
personnel who are employees of the ultimate purchaser of equipment may likewise be owed a warning of potential risks of harm.
For example, a transformer manufacturer is obligated to convey a
warning of the danger of substituting fuses in the product sufficient to reach
an electrician employed by the purchaser of the
25
transformer.

The manufacturer of children's clothing is obligated to furnish a
warning of any flammable characteristics of the fabric. The warning must be calculated to apprise the parents of the children of the
attendant dangers of the clothing." The parent, and not the child,
makes the election based on the warning and instructions for safe
use. An informed choice must be afforded the parent in selecting
and purchasing clothing for minor children.
C. Products Supplied in Bulk
Generally a bulk supplier is not obligated to provide warnings to
ultimate consumers. In Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc.,"7 the manufacturer of bulk transported propane gas was not required to warn the
public and users that the malodorant might be scrubbed and become odorless under certain unusual circumstances. It was the
duty of the gas distributor to communicate appropriate warnings
to the consuming public." Moreover, it would appear that the
223. 275 N.W.2d 915 (Wis. 1979).
224. Id. at 922-23; see also Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50, 55 (N.D. 1974).
225. See Bich v. General Elec. Co., 614 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
226. See Mattocks v. Daylin, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 663, 667 (W.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1979); Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723, 725 (N.H. 1976);
see also Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1962) (furniture polish
used in a household). In Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1968, no writ), the failure to include or affix a label to a household poison advising the potential user that there was no known antidote for the poison
constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition. Id. at 393.
227. 549 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1976).
228. Id. at 1394-95; accord Parkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265, 269 (10th Cir.
1958). But see Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19, 27 (3d Cir. 1975) (supplier of
harmless chemical component was obligated to warn ultimate users or consumers of dangerous propensities of chemical when chemical would be incorporated as a constitutional element of assembled fireworks kit).
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malodorant in the odorless gas itself constituted the warning of the
danger.
Bulk supply presents a particularly difficult problem. For example, chemicals sold by truck transport or rail transport are normally expected to be packaged by others in smaller containers for
ultimate sale to the public. It is realistically impossible to affix any
type of label or provide any type of accompanying document that
would follow the product to its ultimate destination and the ultimate user. Consequently, the intermediate distributor occupies a
particularly important position in the distributive chain of bulk
products that, because of dangerous conditions or hazards, require
warnings and directions for safe use to the ultimate user.
Although the general rule insulates from liability the manufacturer of a product who sells the product in bulk accompanied by a
warning to his immediate vendee, some jurisdictions impose on the
manufacturer the duty to provide an adequate warning to ultimate
users in the distributive chain.2 ' This represents a distorted view
of reality and, in effect, judicially characterizes the supplier as an
insurer against product related harm.
D. PrescriptiveDrugs
Prescriptive drugs, and apparati such as prescriptive medical devices and appliances, constitute an exception to the general principle that the product supplier must warn the ultimate user of a
product. The duty to warn is discharged when the manufacturer
adequately warns the medical profession of dangers associated
with the drug or the medical device.25 ' The duty to warn, of course,
must be reasonable under the circumstances.2 81 This exception is
predicated on the fact that the physician is a learned intermediary
229. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977-79 (Wash. 1978).
230. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1973);
Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973,
writ retd n.r.e.); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977 (Wash. 1978). The warning to the physician, however, must satisfy the test of adequacy. See McCue v. Norwich
Pharmaceutical Co., 453 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1972). The warning to each physician
expected to prescribe the drug must be reasonable under all the circumstances. See Lindsay
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1980).
231. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Richards v.
Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
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who knows the patient and is the party best qualified to make an
informed choice after weighing the utility and benefits of the drug
or medical device against the risk of harm inherent in its use.213
The rule that the drug manufacturer as a matter of law fulfills its
obligation by communicating an adequate warning to the physician
was duly noted in Fellows v. USV PharmaceuticalCorp.3 1 Plaintiff contended that he sustained serious side effects from use of the
prescription drug Doriden. In addressing the plaintiff's strict tort
liability claim, the court stated:
[T]he manufacturer will not incur liability under . . . Section
[402A], unless the manufacturer has failed to provide adequate
warnings of the drug's possible dangers. The audience to whom
these warnings must be directed is the medical community, not the
consuming public. Since there is no dispute regarding the adequacy
of USV's warnings to the medical community as well as to plaintiff's
physician, USV is not liable to plaintiff under Section 402A as a
matter of law."'
Following this same reasoning, the plaintiff-physician who
prescribes antibiotics for self treatment may not recover in strict
tort liability for side effects he suffers. The court in Wolfgruber v.
Upjohn Co.'" noted that a manufacturer of prescriptive drugs is
absolved from liability as a matter of law if it provides specific detailed information concerning the drug to the prescribing
physician.3
This exception applies even though the manufacturer may foresee that physicians may not provide the patient with a warning of
the particular risks involved. The physicians' duty to warn patients
of possible side effects of a drug is not absolute. Since the extent of
disclosure is a matter of medical judgment, a physician's failure to
pass on a warning to a patient does not impose that duty on the
manufacturer. 3 7
232. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1321 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1980); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978).
233. 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980).
234. Id. at 300.
235. 423 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
236. Id. at 97-98.
237. See Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 400 So. 2d 820, 822-23 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1981); cf. Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Ohio 1981).
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On the other hand, the manufacturer who fails to adequately
warn the physician is not only strictly liable to the injured patient,
but may as well'be required to indemnify the prescribing physician. In Oksenholt v. Lederle Laboratories,s2 plaintiff, a physician,
was sued by a patient for loss of vision following use of a drug
prescribed by the physician for treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis. The patient entered into a settlement agreement with the physician and the physician then filed suit against the drug manufacturer for failure to provide adequate warnings of the potential side
effects of the drug. Concluding that the physician could maintain a
suit for indemnity based on a failure to provide adequate warning,
the court stated:
Although plaintiff's injuries are foreseeable, we must still decide
if, as a matter of policy, the duty to inform plaintiff should include a
duty, where the information is inadequate, to protect him against
these particular foreseeable harms. We conclude that it should ....
[A] doctor is entitled to protection against foreseeable harm he may
suffer because he prescribes a particular drug without full awareness
of its potential harm to his patients, where the doctor's lack of
awareness is due to a breach of the duty owed to him by the drug's
manufacturer.'
The general rule excepting the drug manufacturer from providing a warning to the ultimate product consumer was recently rejected in the context of the oral contraceptive. In Lukaszewicz v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,'4 the pill manufacturer was obligated to warn not only the prescribing physician but also to provide an adequate warning to potential users of the possible side
effects from using the pill. The court observed that federal regulations were designed to protect consumers from harmful side effects
associated with oral contraceptives by providing warning to the
consumers.241 This decision contradicts earlier decisions that the
238. 625 P.2d 1357 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
239. Id. at 1362-63.
240. 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis. 1981).

241. Id. at 965; see 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1981). Section 310.501(a) requires that, "patients be fully informed of the benefits and risks involved in the use of these drugs. Information in lay language concerning effectiveness, contraindication, warnings, precautions, and
adverse reactions shall be furnished to each patient receiving oral contraceptives." Id. §
301.501(a). Section 310.501(2)(vi) states that the summary provided each patient must include a statement of the most common side effects such as " nausea and vomiting, weight
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duty to warn of the side effects of oral contraceptive does not extend beyond the prescribing physician. 4
The prescriptive drug exception may also be inapplicable where
drugs are sold over the counter without prescription or where prescriptive drugs may be dispensed in mass immunization without
the intervention of a learned intermediary, such as a physician.2 4
Of course, use of a drug beyond the limitations of a prescription or
without a prescription should foreclose any basis to complain of
24
the lack of a warning.
Like the drug manufacturer, a manufacturer of medical equipment may have a duty to warn physicians and medical personnel
regarding the use of its product. As an example, the manufacturer
of an incubator may be obligated to warn of the risks in giving
supplemental oxygen.

46

Other jurisdictions consider that an incu-

bator manufacturer is not obligated to warn physicians of the state
of current medical research relative to the use of oxygen in conjunction with the product.2

46

Since a physician possesses as much,

if not more, knowledge of the medical significance and risks of
harm in prescribing medical devices for patient care, it seems highly questionable that a manufacturer is under a duty to warn the
physician of knowledge that, by reason of a medical education and
change, change in menses, and breast tenderness." Id. § 310.501(2)(vi).
242. Compare Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 965 (E.D.
Wis. 1981) (manufacturer obligated to warn potential users of possible side effects of pill)
with Timm v. Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 537 (5th Cir. 1980) (manufacturer has no duty to
warn consumer of drug so long as prescribing physician has been adequately warned) and
Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D. Conn. 1978) (where physician had
been adequately warned of increased risk of thrombeombolic disease manufacturer was not
liable) and Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977)
(duty to warn lies with the physician not the manufacturer).
243. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974). In Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979), a jury question was raised whether a warning accompanying Anacin adequately conveyed to the drug purchaser the risk of danger from prolonged use of the aspirin.
Id. at 140.
244. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 557 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977).
245. See Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.).
246. See May v. DaFoe, 611 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). The court in May
stated "[e]quipment manufacturers need not be trained in medical science; for them to
render advice on medical treatment would be suspect and dangerous. Their duty to warn
should relate only to design, engineering, and functional dangers." Id. at 1277.
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training, makes the physician more knowledgeable than the product supplier.
E. Foreseeable Misusers
The duty to warn extends to all individuals who may foreseeably
come in contact with a product in its travel through the distributive chain. Foreseeable users include product handlers and transporters,"' 7 and children playing with a product.240 The duty is
predicated on the product supplier's knowledge and reasonable anticipation of the group or class who foreseeably may come in contact with or use the product.
VI.

A.

LIMITATIONS ON THE DUTY TO WARN

Open and Obvious Dangers

There is no duty to warn ultimate users or consumers of dangers
that are clearly obvious or apparent .' It would be redundant to
warn an ultimate user of a hazard that is clearly obvious and
known. The purpose of a warning is to communicate information
of hazards and risks to afford the ultimate user an opportunity to
weigh the risk of harm against utility of the product." If the danger inherent in the product is obvious, the need to warn is simply
unnecessary.251 This does not necessarily imply, however, that the
247. See Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana S. A., 577 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir.
1978).
248. Novak v. Piggly-Wiggly Puget Sound Co., 591 P.2d 791, 796 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
(manufacturer of B-B gun could anticipate that child might injure himself by means of
ricochet while using gun).
249. See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1978) (obvious
danger posed by multifunctional industrial table saw with an unprotected circular blade
spinning at 3600 revolutions per minute); Price v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 535, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (danger to industrial worker in placing his hand under
rim of pneumactic press); Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 576 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1978) (inherent danger in aiming a B-B gun at another person).
250. See Barrett v. Atlas Powder Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (1978). There is, therefore, no duty to warn a physician of the dangerous side effects of drugs that he is aware of.
See Mulder v. Parke-Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Minn. 1980).
251. The courts emphasize the absence of any duty to warn of known or obvious dangers is due to the fact that no one needs notice or warning of what is either known or
reasonably may be expected to be known. See, e.g., Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d
882, 886 (4th Cir. 1980); Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir.
1980); McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1978).
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product may not be defective in design.
The determination of whether a danger is obvious or apparent is
dependent on a consideration of the status, age, intelligence and
training of the user. In McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings Inc.,22 the
plaintiff, a paraplegic prior to the accident in question, was injured
when a wheeled commode in which he was sitting tipped forward.
The manufacturer was not obligated to furnish a warning because
of the plaintiff's knowledge as well as the obvious nature of the
danger of the commode tipping if he leaned too far-forward. 253 In
Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co.,"' plaintiff was injured when his
hand was caught in an unprotected saw blade. The Court concluded that a warning of the hazard posed by the unprotected saw
blade was unnecessary since the condition of the product and the
hazard associated with that product was obvious and fully apprecis
ated by the user. 255 In Gilmour v. Norris Paint & Varnish Co.,25

plaintiff's finger was amputated after he placed his finger over the
nozzle of an airless paint sprayer causing paint thinner to be injected in his finger. Affixed to the tip of the sprayer's nozzle was
the cautionary language: WARNING: IMPROPER USE CAN
CAUSE INJURY-Read Instructions. Moreover, the court concluded that the warning given was adequate as a matter of law.
The manufacturer was not required to warn that the spray could
penetrate the skin and poison upon injection when the plaintiff
possessed full knowledge of this danger.' 7
The nature and degree of the risk of harm must be open and
fully appreciated. In Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., " plaintiff, a repairman, was attempting to mount a 16 inch tire on a 16.05 inch
rim, when the tire exploded. Although recognizing that a warning
of danger is not required when the user possesses a knowledge of
that danger, the court observed that "a belief that it should not be
252. 575 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1978).
253. Id. at 159-60; accord Sowles v. Urschel Laboratories, Inc., 595 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th
Cir. 1979) (no duty to warn machine operators of obvious danger of hand injury while attempting to unclog the blades of poultry dicing machine); see also Noel, Products Defective
Because of Inadequate Directionsor Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 274 (1969) ("apparent dangers of this sort do not violate the normal expectations of the typical user of the product").
254. 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978).
255. Id. at 102.
256. 627 P.2d 1288 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
257. Id. at 1289-91.
258. 608 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1979).
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done because it may hurt the tire, or even that it may cause injury
is different from knowing that there is a risk of explosion, of serious or even fatal bodily harm. Not merely some59 risk but the nature
and degree of the risk must be appreciated.'
Similarly, in Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Manufacturing Co.,'' the
court stringently interpreted the open and obvious limitation on
the duty to warn. Plaintiff sustained burn injuries as a result of a
gas water heater explosion in a utility room. Plaintiff had stored a
two gallon can of gasoline in close proximity to the heater. The
danger of storing combustibles in close proximity to a gas-fired appliance having a constant pilot light was not so open and obvious
to obviate the necessity of a warning. The court reasoned "the
flame of a pilot light is generally out of sight and the danger is
hidden from view, perhaps frequently forgotten
and, in the case of
21
some individuals, not even recognized.'

B.

Common Knowledge to the General Public

A corollary to the rule limiting the duty to warn of obvious dangers is the rule that there is no duty to warn of dangers that are
commonly known and appreciated by the general public.' As an
example, in-Garmen v. American Clipper Corp.,'' the supplier of
a motor home equipped with a propane gas stove is not required to
warn of the risk of harm attending the use of natural gas.2" The
court in Garmen stated:
Even if its [the cook stove's] use required the use of natural gas,
259. Id. at 819. The court emphasized both the appreciation of the danger and the
degree of risk constituted the controlling factors in assessing a duty to provide an adequate
warning and instructions for use. Id. at 819.
260. 601 P.2d 298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
261. Id. at 300; see also Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 76 (7th Cir.
1981) (danger of leaking propane gas in camper was not open and obvious).
- 262. See, e.g., Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir.
1976) (dangers of kerosene, particularly when combined with other flammable products, are
commonly known); Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods, Inc., 559 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1976) (common knowledge that pork had to be cooked to avoid trichinosis); Vance v.
Miller-Taylor Shoe Co., 251 S.E.2d 52, 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (known risk of slipping and
falling while wearing newly purchased shoes).
263. 173 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
264. Id. at 23; accord Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 76 (7th Cir. 1981)
("explosive nature of propane gas, however, was not danger about which Karri-On had a
duty to warn. The gas line system of the camper, not the gas, is the defective product").
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that fact does not require a special warning. Use of natural gas is
not an activity the danger of which is not known by a substantial
number of people. To the contrary, natural gas has been in use for
generations for lighting, cooking, heating, and providing energy. The
use of any product can be said to involve some risk because of the
circumstances surrounding even its normal use. Nonetheless, the

makers of such products are not liable under any theory, for merely

failing to warn of injury which may befall a person who uses that

product in an unsafe place or in conjunction with another product

which because of a defect or improper use is itself unsafe. This is

especially so where the risk is commonly known."
Likewise, the common knowledge of the flammability of gasoline
was clearly implicit in the holding that a paint manufacturer is not
required to warn that dried paint should not be removed by gasoline near open flame.sa
Judicial interpretation varies whether a particular danger is so
commonly known that it obviates the necessity of a warning. In
Hunt v. City Stores, Inc.," 7 plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy caught
his foot between an escalator and the side panel of the escalator.
The particular risk or hazard of wearing rubber soled shoes on an
escalator was not common knowledge that would release the manufacturer of the duty to warn." In Shuput v. Heublein, Inc.,"9 the
propensities of "bubbly wine" was not deemed a matter of such
common knowledge as to be established as a matter of law. The
manufacturer and distributor of champagne were required to warn
bottle cap
of the potential danger of spontaneous ejection of the
2 70
bottle.
the
within
gases
of
pressure
the
resulting from
It is important to note that, while certain general dangers may
be matters of common knowledge for which there is no duty to
warn, there may be other dangers closely related to the general
danger for which there is a duty to warn. For example, while the
danger of explosion associated with dynamite is commonly known,
265. Garmen v. American Clipper Corp., 173 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

266. See Johnson v. Jones-Blair Paint Co., 607 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. -Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It is likewise common knowledge that a nightgown will burn if
exposed to an open flame and alleviates the necessity for providing a warning. Brech v. J.C.
F. Supp. (D. S.D. 1982).
Penny Co., 267. 375 So. 2d 1194 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
268. Id. at 1196.
269. 511 F.2d 1104 (10th Cir. 1975).
270. Id. at 1106.
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the latent danger in the manner of lighting the dynamite safety
fuse may require a warning.'"7 Each unreasonably dangerous hazard associated with a product must be scrutinized to determine
whether the particular danger, indeed, is obvious even to those
who are not particularly knowledgeable.
C. Common Knowledge Within the Product User's Trade or
Professions
A product that is marketed to a group or a class possessing a
special knowledge, sophistication or expertise of the dangerous
characteristics of a product require no warning.27 2 In Huff v. Elmhurst - Chicago Stone Co.,278 a construction laborer instituted suit
against a concrete manufacturer to recover for burn injuries sustained when liquid concrete splashed on his clothing and inside his
boots. The manufacturer was not obligated to warn of the danger
of liquid concrete burns, which was a well known hazard within the
construction industry.27 4 Similarily, in Martinez v. Dixie Carriers,
Inc.,"5 the Fifth Circuit concluded that a' warning of a danger
commonly known by the trade of which the plaintiff was a member
was unnecessary. The court noted that the chemical Hytrol-D was
distributed only to industrial users and the manufacturer was entitled to rely on the professional knowledge and expertise of those
reasonably expected to use the product. Knowledge of the danger
and risk of harm that would be communicated by a warning is
chargeable to the user as a member of the knowledgeable group.276
.In Lockett v. General Electric Co., s 77 the court determined there
was no duty to warn of an unguarded shaft to a shipbuilder en271. Cooley v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763, 771 (Iowa 1974).
272. See, e.g., Strong v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981)

(no duty to warn gas company that compression couplings could pull out); Martinez v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 464 (5th Cir. 1976) (manufacturer relieved of duty to warn of
dangers associated with handling product such as Hytrol-D when individuals harmed were
experienced professionals in the field of stripping and cleaning tools); Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19, 26 (3d Cir. 1975) ("duty to warn does not rise if user is knowl-

edgeable in the handling of the product"); contra, Frazier v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 607 P.2d
1296, 1300 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
273. 419 N.E.2d 561 (11. App. Ct. 1981).
274. Id. at 567.
275. 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976).
276. Id. at 467.
277. 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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gaged in cleaning the ship's drive shaft.27 8 Similarly, in Tri-State
Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 279 the danger of split rim

wheels exploding when the tires were being inflated was a matter
of common knowledge within the occupation in which the plaintiff
practiced. All parties to the lawsuit were associated with automotive repair in some capacity and normal practice contemplated the
use of a cage or chains when inflating a tire on a split rim. The
essence of the duty to warn is the need to convey unknown risks of
dangers to the ultimate users. When this information is within the
specialty area, sophistication or expertise of a particular user or
group of users no duty is invoked.280 It would indeed represent an
idle gesture to warn individuals who already possess the
knowledge.
The mere fact, however, that an ultimate user possesses a generalized expertise or sophistication about the product may not always control. In Billiar v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,2 '" plaintiff was burned when she inadvertently brushed her face with her
hand that was contaminated by a caustic chemical resin. The adequacy of warning of the dangerous propensity of the resin that was
mixed with the compound constituted a fact issue and could not be
determined as a matter of law. The knowledgeable or sophisticated
user exception was deemed inapplicable to an employee who had
only ten months experience and was not considered to possess any
expertise of the specific characteristics and constituent elements of
caustic chemicals. The sophisticated user exception may not be
evaluated in a vacuum. It may be analyzed and applied only in
light of the degree of expertise by the user."'
This exception is likewise inapplicable, and thus a warning is
deemed necessary even to experienced trade professionals, where
the particular risk posed by the product contradicts the special
knowledge possessed by the experienced worker. As an example, in
278. Id. at 1208-09.
279. 364 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 1978).

280. Id. at 660; accord, Strong v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. Inc., 667 F.2d 682, 687
(8th Cir. 1981); Fierro v. International Harvestor, 179 Cal. Rptr. 923, 925 (Cal. Ct. app.
1982).
281. 623 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1980).
282. Id. at 244. The knowledgeable user exception has not been applied to lay individuals even though they may possess some familiarity with the product and its propensities. Id.

at 244. Even as to individuals possessing an expertise, the extent of that expertise must be
evaluated. lonmar Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec.,2a8 plaintiff's husband was fatally electrocuted while testing a new 7200 volt transformer. The electrical
system of this particular transformer was energized with the fuse
switch in an open position. The original manufacturer of the component had attached an adhesive label to the fuse which stated:
"WARNING; FUSE OR SWITCH MAY BE LIVE IN OPEN POSITION." The defendant, assembler-manufacturer and seller of
the transformer, removed the adhesive and attached the following
warning: "HIGH VOLTAGE, DO NOT TOUCH" and HIGH
VOLTAGE, REMOVE WITH HOTSTICK." Noting the misleading nature of the warning to an experienced electrician, the court
stated:
.. [W e have testimony from the electrical crew and some of
the expert witnesses that the switching assembly in the transformer
in question was unique. None of the crew with Pearson had worked
on such a transformer. It is undisputed that Pearson and the crew
knew that electricity of 7200 volts was present in the transformer
and that such a situation required careful attention while working
therein. The general warning: 'HIGH VOLTAGE, DO NOT
TOUCH,' which HDE substituted for the MGE recommended warning admittedly failed to inform Pearson of the unique characteristic
of the fuse switch being 'live' in the open position .... It is without dispute that the warning on the fused switch made no mention
of it being live in the open position. It would appear that Pearson's
electrical expertise was sufficient to warn him that the fuse switch
would be live in the closed position. Likewise, his past training
would lead him to believe that the fuse switch would be dead in the
open position. It would require a specific warning in clear language
to change his evaluation of the fatal danger that confronted him. We
hold that HDE's general warning failed to convey to Pearson the
specific danger and was therefore inadequate.'"
Similarly, a repairman unfamiliar with a particular danger posed
in repairing components within the product is entitled to an adequate warning.5
283. 618 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
284. Id. at 788-89.
285. See Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court stressed that the plaintiff, despite his

experience as a repairman, was not acquainted with the particular apparatus and the
hazards of performing repairs on components that were hidden and enclosed within the
cylinder. Id. at 577. This rationale was applied by the court in Fiorentino v. A.E. Staley
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A somewhat unique approach was adopted in Marchant v. Lorain Division of Koehring.2" An experienced crane operator received injuries when the crane "double blocked" and the bucket in
which he was riding crashed to the ground. The crane operator was
generally aware of the possibility of double blocking through his
experience in his trade. Nevertheless the manufacturer was impressed with the duty to warn, in the absence of evidence that the
plaintiff was cognizant of this particular crane's tendency to
double block.287
D. Modification of the Product
A manufacturer is not obligated to warn of the dangers inherent
in a product that has been altered or modified by the user without
approval of or consultation with the manufacturer. 8 8 In Talley v.
City Tank Corp.,2 89 plaintiff, an employee of the sanitation department of the City of LaGrange, was working on a garbage truck that
had been manufactured by the defendant and assembled and sold
to the city by Service Systems, Inc. The truck had originally been
designed and equipped with a rear lifting and loading system but
the city found it necessary to modify the lifting system on its garbage trucks in order to accomodate the design of its trash containers. Affirming a summary judgment for the manufacturer, the
court declared:
We hold there is no duty to warn that a redesign and replacement of
an integral and ultimately injurious component of a product will destroy the original design and may result in an essentially different
product with new 'dangerous propensities.' The consumer's conscious decision not to use the product as it was originally manufactured and designed creates a danger readily apparent even without a
warning. An 'obvious' danger of totally redesigning and replacing an
Mfg. Co., 416 N.E.2d 998 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) in holding a warning given to professional
carpenters was too oblique to alert the user to the specific risks in using a highly flammable
adhesive cement. Id. at 1004. But in Clayton v. General Motors Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH)
9170 (S.C. 1982), the South Carolina Supreme Court
rejected a duty to warn a mechanic to avoid overtorquing a lugbolt.
286. 251 S.E.2d 189 (S.C. 1979).
287. Id. at 192.
288. See Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 565 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Thornhill
v. Black Sevalls & Bryson, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1189, 1192 (La. 1981).
289. 279 S.E.2d 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
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integral component of a product to facilitate the consumer's own individual particularized use of the product is that elimination and
replacement of the manufacturer's original design may result in an
instrumentality which will be unsafe for the consumer's purpose.
There is no duty to warn of the obvious danger of using a manufacturer's product as the mere foundation from which a redesigned instrumentality will be produced. In such circumstances, "[i]t was instead the duty of the person reusing [the product] to make it safe
for the purpose for which he intended to use it. In effect, [the manufacturer] had no duty to protect the [consumer] against such an intervening cause."0
The effect of subsequent product alteration was likewise applied
in the recent case of Hollinger v. Wagner Mining Equipment
Co. 291 The decedent, an iron miner, was struck and killed by a
scooptram, a diesel powered vehicle used to transport materials in
underground mines. The scooptram was originally marketed by the
manufacturer with an audible warning device to alert workers of
its presence in the area, but the horn system had been removed
prior to the accident by the decedent's employer. The court observed that removal of the horn by the employer substantially
changed the scooptram and foreclosed any further duty on manufacturer to provide additional warnings."'
Similarly, in Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,"' substantial modification of a power punch press was accomplished by the plaintiff's
employer. The court stated that "[T]he obligation that generates
the duty to warn does not extend to the speculative anticipation of
how manufactured components, not in and of themselves dangerous or defective, can become potentially dangerous dependent
upon the nature of their integration into a unit design and assembled by another."' "
In Shawver v. Roberts Corp.,29s plaintiff was injured when the
conveyor manufactured by defendant was mistakenly activated by
a fellow employee. The original manufacturer was not obligated to
warn since plaintiff's employer had installed the specific controls of
290. Id. at 271.

291. 505 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
292. Id. at 900-01; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965).

293. 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977).
294. Id. at 272.
295. 280 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. 1979).
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the conveyor that caused the injury. The conveyor was sold without a control system and it was understood between the manufacturer and the industrial purchaser that the conveyor was subject to
further processing."'
A duty to warn may arise if the manufacturer or product supplier can reasonably anticipate that a product will change and become unreasonably dangerous through regular use or predictable
deterioration. 97 This relates to the obligation of the product supplier to know and to reasonably anticipate the use and environment of use of a product. A kindred concept concerns the supplier's duty to warn of dangers resulting from the removal and
replacement of a component part during maintenance or servicing
of the product. In Stewart v. Scott-Kitz Miller Co., 9 8a the user of a
forklift instituted suit against the manufacturer for injuries arising
when the lift apparatus malfunctioned. The malfunction occurred
because certain bolts were replaced backwards during the course of
routine maintenance of the machine performed by plaintiff's employer. The necessity for. removing the bolts during routine maintenance and the possibility of the bolt being replaced backwards
was entirely foreseeable when the forklift was designed and manufactured. 99 Consequently, the manufacturer was obligated to post
clear and adequate warnings on the equipment advising maintenance personnel as well as users concerning the consequences of
incorrect insertion of the bolts. And in Bich v. General Electric
Co.,300 the court recognized the duty to warn where a component
was replaced with a similar component part supplied by a different
manufacturer. Plaintiff, an electrician, replaced a GE fuse housed
in a GE transformer with a fuse manufactured by Westinghouse,
and an explosion occurred. Both fuses were labeled with the same
voltage and were the same length, but the Westinghouse fuse was
slightly larger in diameter. A duty to warn users not to substitute
fuses with those of another manufacturer was required.301 The
296. Id. at 232.
297. See Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
298. 626 P.2d 329 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
299. Id. at 330.
300. 614 P.2d 1323 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
301. Id. at 1328. The court observed, "It would have been a simple and inexpensive
matter for G. E. to have included on its fuses a warning not to substitute fuses or to have
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duty to warn continues to depend upon the foreseeable manner
and environment of use of each product. Excessive dangers of significant magnitude preventable by appropriate warnings or instructions for safe use determine the parameters of the product
supplier's duty.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Strict tort liability encompasses marketing defects that render a
product unreasonably dangerous. This includes the failure to warn,
the failure to warn adequately and/or the failure to furnish directions and instructions for safe and efficient use of a product.
The application of strict tort liability to the marketing area has
proved to be the most troublesome of the three types of defects
embraced by Section 402A of the Restatement. Logically, the concept of warning falls within the aegis of negligence and not strict
tort liability. An analysis quickly discloses that the conduct of the
manufacturer is of critical importance in determining whether a
warning or instructions should accompany a product to the ultimate user. It is submitted that the extension of strict tort liability
to encompass the marketing cases is neither contemplated nor warranted under the socioeconomic rationale that undergrids Section
402A.
Perhaps most importantly, the courts must adopt a reasonable
approach to the theory of warning defects under strict tort liability. Several jurisdictions have already extended Section 402A to
the point of imposing absolute liability on the product supplier.
Strict tort liability, however, was never intended to eliminate the
tort nature of this reparations doctrine and to create a judicial
form of insurer protection against product related injuries.3 " A
given information regarding the time-delay characteristics of its fuses." Id. at 1328. A similar approach was adopted by the court in Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec. Co., 618 S.W.2d 784
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A warning on a transformer
"HIGH VOLTAGE, DO NOT TOUCH" substituted for an original warning on a fuse

"WARNING-FUSE OR SWITCH MAY BE LIVE IN THE OPEN POSITION," was not
only deemed inadequate but, as to a trained electrician, misleading of the danger confronting the workman. Id. at 785.
302. See Little, Products Liability-The Growing Uncertainty About Warnings, 12

FORUM 995, 1011 (1977). As noted by Little, "Holding a manufacturer to a standard

amounting to a 'burden of clairvoyance which is doubtful the prophetic powers of Nostrodamus could meet' may be tantamount to the imposition of insurer's liability which the
manufacturing industry simply may not be capable of withstanding." Id. at 1011.
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manufacturer should not be permitted to sell a product containing
serious operating hazards to an unsuspecting user. Neither should
the manufacturer be declared liable for product related accidents
attributable to the improper or misuse of a product by the user or
some other individual. A rational balance is imperative and the unrealistic imposition of liability based on esoteric perceptions of
how additional or more graphic warnings could have possibly foreclosed the occurrence of an accident vividly attests to distortions
evolving in the warning arena. 00 Allegations of a failure to warn
adequately of a particular danger or risk of harm are increasing in
product related accidents. Although the manufacturer must approach the marketing of its products responsibly, it seems equally
axiomatic that product users should not be excused for the consequences of irresponsible uses of the products because of the alleged
absence of a comprehensive litany of every conceivable warning.
Reasonable consumer expectations must continue as the governing
standard if further distortion of the tort nature of the marketing
defect cause of action is to be avoided.

303. For example, in Ziglar v. E.I. Du Pont De nemours & Co., 280 S.E.2d 510 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981), the manufacturer of a crop poison was deemed liable for an inadequate warning
that proclaimed "DANGEROUS-POISON" and which was accompanied by several red
skull and crossbones on the product container. The court concluded that the manufacturer
should have added a coloration to the liquid to insure that it would be completely distinguishable from water. The question may be posed: if the manufacturer added orange coloration, should it then warn that the liquid is not tea or an orange drink? If a yellow coloration,
should the manufacturer warn that the liquid is not Gatorade? Legal duties should be predicated on realistic considerations. Id. at 515-16.
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